Security and Privacy Aspects of Low-Cost Radio Frequency Identification Systems

By Stephen A. Weis, Sanjay E. Sarma, R. Rivest, Daniel W. Engels. International Conference on Security in Pervasive Computing, 2003

1,516 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Information Systems, Media Technology

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9df0718fe818045b60fb606c1557490698f06c85

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Citations in the corpus

The blocker tag: selective blocking of RFID tags for consumer privacy (2003, background): “[18, 19], a tag may be “locked” so that it refuses to reveal its ID until it is “unlocked.”
"Yoking-proofs" for RFID tags (2004, positive): “We suggest that such proofs are a useful tool for maintaining integrity in supply chains, particularly as RFID data will commonly flow across multiple, loosely affiliated organizations.”
Defining Strong Privacy for RFID (2007, background): ““hash-lock” system [26] is (r, s, t)-private and cross-reader (r, s, t)-private for polynomial r, s, t.”
RFID security and privacy: a research survey (2006, background): “A version of this idea directed at tree-walking, an anticollision protocol we described, first appeared in [69]. significant problem of authentication.”
Authenticating Pervasive Devices with Human Protocols (2005, background): “Rather than sharing a single k-bit random secret x, the tag and reader now share an additional k-bit random secret y. Unlike the case in the HB protocol, the tag in the HB+ protocol first generates random k-bit “blinding” vector b and sends it to the reader.”
EMAP: An Efficient Mutual-Authentication Protocol for Low-Cost RFID Tags (2006, background): “Protocol HLS [14] EHLS [14] HBVI [4] MAP [15] EMAP”
A Scalable, Delegatable Pseudonym Protocol Enabling Ownership Transfer of RFID Tags (2005, background): “Some of the early work in this area has proposed protocols for mutual authentication between the tag and the reader [8, 5].”
M2AP: A Minimalist Mutual-Authentication Protocol for Low-Cost RFID Tags (2006, background): “Protocol HLS [11] EHLS [11] HBVI [5] MAP [13] M(2)AP”
On Privacy Models for RFID (2007, background): “Related work. Many simple challenge-response protocols have been proposed without addressing corruption [14,28, 39 ].”
Security and Cooperation in Wireless Networks (2007, background): “RFID privacy: Weis, Sarma, Rivest, and Engels were among the first researchers who began to investigate privacy (and security) problems in RFID systems [375, 339].”
Security and Privacy Vulnerabilities of In-Car Wireless Networks: A Tire Pressure Monitoring System Case Study (2010, background): “Devices being studied include RFID systems [27, 30, 41], massmarket UbiComp devices [38], household robots [14], and implantable medical devices [21].”
Minimalist Cryptography for Low-Cost RFID Tags (2004, background): “Weis, Sarma, Rivest, and Engels [ 45 ] also propose a collection of privacy-enforcement ideas for RFID tags in general environments.”
A Lightweight RFID Protocol to protect against Traceability and Cloning attacks (2005, methodology): “Furthermore, despite its simplicity this protocol is already an improvement of the basic schemes proposed in [3, 4] offering properties such as efficiency of identification, privacy and forward security.”
Cryptographic Approach to “Privacy-Friendly” Tags (2003, methodology): “The operation cost of the back-end server must include decryption calculation as in [25], and must include exhaustive search as in [2].”
RFID Handbook: Applications, Technology, Security, and Privacy (2008, methodology): “Time-memory Hash Lock [ 3 ] Hash Lock Normal No”
mCrypton - A Lightweight Block Cipher for Security of Low-Cost RFID Tags and Sensors (2005, background): “For example, in the case of low-cost RFID tags, one of the most resource-scarce ubiquitous computing devices, it is estimated that security resources available to a 5 cent design may be limited to hundreds of bits of storage, roughly 500-5,000 gates [ 12 ].”
SASI: A New Ultralightweight RFID Authentication Protocol Providing Strong Authentication and Strong Integrity (2007, background): “Ç”