Authenticating Pervasive Devices with Human Protocols

By Ari Juels, Stephen A. Weis. Annual International Cryptology Conference, 2005

792 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Computer Networks and Communications, Information Systems, Media Technology

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6900f82508020fac97c98b60d0e264839df767b5

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Computer Networks and Communications

In Information Systems

In Media Technology

Citations in the corpus

RFID security and privacy: a research survey (2006, background): “To prevent RFID-tag tracking, it is necessary that tag identifiers be suppressed, or that they change over time. c) Relabeling: Sarma, Weis, and Engels (SWE) propose the idea of effacing unique identifiers in tags at the point of sale [60] to address the tracking problem, but retaining product-type ”
SIMON and SPECK: Block Ciphers for the Internet of Things (2015, background): “For example, the consensus has long been that a bud-get of 2000 GE is all the chip area that might reasonably be allocated for security on the most constrained RFID tags [36], and this is well out of reach for AES implementations.”
On Privacy Models for RFID (2007, neutral): “for the HB+ protocol [17,23,25] or the OSK protocol [24,30]).”
Fast Cryptographic Primitives and Circular-Secure Encryption Based on Hard Learning Problems (2009, methodology): “Indeed, previous works relied on these properties to obtain cryptography with low complexity [32,4,35,6], and to derive desirable cryptographic features such as random self-reducibility (with respect to the choice of a) and pseudorandomness [10].”
The PHOTON Family of Lightweight Hash Functions (2011, background): “Note that a basic RFID tag may have a total gate count of anywhere from 1000-10000 gates, with only 200-2000 gates budgeted for security [22].”
KLEIN: A New Family of Lightweight Block Ciphers (2010, neutral): “For a hardware implementation, a complete-including the analog part-low-cost RFID tag might have between 1,000 and 10,000 GE, and for security components may occupy up to 2,000 GE [25].”
On agnostic boosting and parity learning (2008, background): “Parity with noise also seems to be a diﬃcult-on-average problem, and thus is useful as an hypothesis for achieving conditional hardness-on-average results and as a cryptographic primitive [3, 20, 9, 10].”
SASI: A New Ultralightweight RFID Authentication Protocol Providing Strong Authentication and Strong Integrity (2007, background): “Ç”
Lightweight Cryptography Algorithms for Resource-Constrained IoT Devices: A Review, Comparison and Research Opportunities (2021, background): “Normally, 200 to 2000 GE (out of 1000 to 10,000 GE of total available) are allocated for security reasons in an economical RFID tag [44].”
An Active Attack Against HB+ - A Provably Secure Lightweight Authentication Protocol (2005, background): “We have described an active attack against the HB protocol [1] that has a complexity linear in the length of the keys and number of rounds.”
Pseudorandom Functions and Lattices (2012, background): “As evidence, consider that recent constructions of weaker primitives such as symmetric authentication protocols [18, 19, 20], randomized weak PRFs [4], and message-authentication codes [34, 21] from noisy-learning problems are all inherently randomized functions, where security relies on introducing”