Human Capital versus Signaling Models: University Access and High School Dropouts

By Kelly Bedard. Journal of Political Economy, 2001

268 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9c1f41161e386feea433853106f15566ad6e503c

How researchers see this paper

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In Economics and Econometrics

1. Joan Esteban
2. Debraj Ray
3. Damon Clark
4. P. Martorell
5. S. Blöndal
6. Fabian Lange
7. Simon Field
8. Hanming Fang

In Sociology and Political Science

1. Debraj Ray
2. Joan Esteban
3. S. Blöndal
4. Fabian Lange
5. Simon Field
6. Hanming Fang
7. P. Martorell
8. R. Topel

Citations in the corpus

• Disentangling the College Wage Premium: Estimating a Model with Endogenous Education Choices (2006, background): “In similar spirits, Bedard (2001) showed that in a signaling model, better university access in terms of a local presence of colleges may increase the high school drop-out rate, whereas in a human capital model, the high school drop-out rate should be unaffected by the easier university access.”
• Investment in human capital through upper-secondary and tertiary education (2002, background): “The signalling role of education is analysed in Bedard (2001) for the United States and in Harmon and Walker (2001) for the United Kingdom.”
• The Signaling Value of a High School Diploma (2014, background): “…directly affect (as they would if those students wished to differentiate themselves from the directly affected students - Lang and Kropp (1986) and Bedard (2001)); whether wage equations fit better for workers in occupations in which productivity cannot be observed (as they would if productivity…”
• A Signaling Perspective on Employment-Based Reentry Programming Training Completion as a Desistance Signal (2012, unknown): “One of the major challenges to empirically verifying the signaling effect is that the human capital theory of education and the signaling theory of education make very similar predictions—they both predict that wages will increase with education (Bedard, 2001).”
• Investment in Human Capital Through Post-Compulsory Education and Training: Selected Efficiency and Equity Aspects (2002, background): “The signalling role of education is analysed in Bedard (2001) for the United States and in Harmon and Walker (2001) for the United Kingdom.”
• Publicly Provided Education (2002, background): “Some support of screening does come from analysis of incentives to complete high school when there are fewer college graduates Bedard (2001). See Riley (2001) for a review of general theoretical and empirical work.”
• The Social Value of Education and Human Capital (2006, background): “This idea lies at the heart of the empirical approach in Lang and Kropp (1986) and Bedard (2001).”
• Inequality, Lobbying and Resource Allocation (2006, background): “, Fernandez and Gali (1999) and Bedard (2001) (in the context of educational attainments) and Che and”
• Judging Borrowers by the Company They Keep: Friendship Networks and Information Asymmetry in Online Peer-to-Peer Lending (2013, unknown): “…a friend learns about the default (see e.g., Thorne and Anderson 2006, Cohen-Cole and Duygan-Bump 2008).2 If stigma costs matter, borrowers who are more likely to default should avoid 1 See the Nobel prize address of Spence (2002), as well as Weiss (1995) and Bedard (2001), on education signaling.”