The Real Effects of Government‐Owned Banks: Evidence from an Emerging Market
By Daniel Carvalho. 2014
357 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9bd4a702d8cd3e3c568c80ce6c1ee7ebef2e1c5b
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Aldo Musacchio
- Sérgio Giovanetti Lazzarini
- Ata Can Bertay
- Rodrigo Bandeira-de-Mello
- Asli Demirgüç-Kunt
- Harry Huizinga
- Rosilene Marcon
- Thorsten Beck
In Finance
- Asli Demirgüç-Kunt
- Harry Huizinga
- Ata Can Bertay
- Rodrigo Bandeira-de-Mello
- Sérgio Giovanetti Lazzarini
- Aldo Musacchio
- Rosilene Marcon
- Luc Laeven
In Strategy and Management
- Aldo Musacchio
- Sérgio Giovanetti Lazzarini
- Rodrigo Bandeira-de-Mello
- Asli Demirgüç-Kunt
- Harry Huizinga
- Rosilene Marcon
- Sunny Li Sun
- Hao Liang
Citations in the corpus
- Electoral Cycles in Savings Bank Lending (2017, unknown): “Carvalho (2012) documents that Brazilian firms eligible for government bank lending expand employment in politically contested regions prior to elections by shifting employment from other regions.”
- State ownership reinvented? Explaining performance differences between state‐owned and private firms (2018, unknown): “…to distinguish between different types of state-related owners and identify other conduits of governmental influence such as state credit (Carvalho, 2014), discretionary regulation (Lin & Milhaupt, 2013), or political connections (Liang et al., 2014), which are more difficult to observe…”
- What Do State-Owned Development Banks Do? Evidence from BNDES, 2002–09 (2015, result): “2 Carvalho (2010) studies the criteria for the allocation of loans and finds, consistent with our finding, that firms in regions governed by politicians allied with the federal government receive more funding from BNDES.”
- Bank Ownership and Credit Over the Business Cycle: Is Lending by State Banks Less Procyclical? (2012, background): “Importantly, country level studies also sh w that politicians use government bank 4 lending to provide political patronage leading to significant credit misallocation (See for example Cole (2009) for India, Khwaja and Mian (2005) for Pakistan, Carvalho (2010) for Brazil, and Sapienza (2004) for Ital”