Why conditional aid does not work and what can be done about it

By Jakob Svensson. 2003

380 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Development, Economics and Econometrics, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9a27e7ddcc7228e1b571c84297422cb2cba5fb70

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Citations in the corpus

Why some countries thrive despite corruption: The role of trust in the corruption–efficiency relationship (2010, background): “It is commonly believed that corruption distorts the allocation of resources by diverting much needed capital for economic development to corrupt officials’ pockets (Svensson, 2003).”
FRAGILE STATES AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY (2011, neutral): “An interesting agenda for future research would be to combine aspects of our framework with explicit modeling of mechanisms that might help achieve credible enforcement, as in Svensson (2003).”
What Undermines Aid's Impact on Growth? (2005, background): “…Weder (2000), Bauer (1971), Collier and Dollar (2002), Dalgaard, Hansen, and Tarp (2004), Friedman (1958), Hansen and Tarp (2000), Roodman (2004), Svensson (2003), and World Bank (1998). short run growth – it is still a puzzle why aid does not have robust and discernible longerterm effects on…”
Aid and Development (2006, background): “12 past in furthering growth and development, see Tarp (2000). Aid is not equally effective everywhere, and much remains to be learnt about how aid impacts in theory and practice.”
IMF conditionality: theory and evidence (2008, neutral): “Svensson (2003) provides theoretical support.”
The Economics of International Aid (2003, background): “1997; Killick 1997; White and Morrissey, 1997; Adam and O'Connell, 1999; Kanbur 2000; and Svensson 2000, 2002).”
The institutional economics of foreign aid (2006, positive): “Using data from 200 structural adjustment programs, Svensson (2003) shows that the share of committed funds disbursed during the period when the agreed upon reforms should have been implemented is uncorrelated with recipients’ willingness to reform (notwithstanding if the recipient government…”
Was Development Assistance a Mistake (2012, neutral): “Svensson (2003) points out that aid agencies emphasis on disbursing aid funds makes their promises to withhold funds not credible even if aid conditions are not met.”
Are “New” Donors Challenging World Bank Conditionality? (2017, methodology): “Svensson (2003) analyzes around 200 World Bank structural adjustment programs and observes that the disbursement of loans is not linked to complying with conditions: in other words, disbursement decisions are independent of reform efforts in recipient countries.”
Does Conditionality Work? A Test for an Innovative US Aid Scheme (2011, neutral): “Svensson (2000) presents similar results for ethnically diverse recipient countries in which social groups compete over common-pool resources, whereas Tavares (2003) finds aid to be associated with less corruption.”
Are Aid Agencies Improving (2007, neutral): “92, indicating that the IMF continued to lend more than average to the same countries that had spent above average time in IMF programs before the IEO report. Th e eff ect is more than one for one, rejecting any tendency for above average IMF loan recipients to regress back towards the mean. Again a”
Natural resources, aid, and democratization: A best-case scenario (2007, background): “Formal models of donor-recipient relations are scarce, with some exceptions being the work of Mosley (1992) and Svensson (2000, 2003) .”