Regulations, Market Structure, Institutions, and the Cost of Financial Intermediation

By Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, Luc Laeven, Ross Levine. 2004

1,027 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/99d3ccf3f230f692724f7ab8888bfee7f0c98b53

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Citations in the corpus

Political Institutions and Bank Risk-Taking Behavior (2015, neutral): “For example, Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2004) argue, after a thorough analysis of banking industries of 72 countries, that the extent of competition in banking industry is more a national level preference.”
How Bank Market Concentration, Regulation, and Institutions Shape the Real Effects of Banking Crises (2010, methodology): “This measure is used, among others, by Cetorelli and Gambera (2001), Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2004), Beck et al. (2006).”
Cross-Country Comparisons of Competition and Pricing Power in (2006, methodology): “An empirical approach is adopted similar to that of Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine (2004) and Claessens and Laeven (2004) to examine the influence these characteristics have on competition measures for Europe.”
Do foreign banks increase competition? Evidence from emerging Asian and Latin American banking markets (2011, background): “The proponents in favor of foreign bank entry argue that it enhances competition in domestic banking markets, improves the efficiency of domestic bank operations, provides financial services at lower costs, and promotes economic growth by boosting the efficiency of resource allocation (Claessens et ”
Efficiency of Banks: Recent Evidence from the Transition Economies of Europe, 1993–2000 (2007, background): “On the possible effects of consolidation, Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2004) find that industry concentration in developing countries is negatively associated with the efficiency of the banking system.”
Financial liberalization and bank risk-taking: International evidence (2014, background): “We follow Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2004) by limiting our analysis to commercial banks because the regulatory data and theory on bank risk-taking focuses on incentives of private bank owners and on lending and deposit bank activities.”