Rethinking Mechanistic Explanation

By S. Glennan. 2002

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Citations in the corpus

Explanation in Human-AI Systems: A Literature Meta-Review, Synopsis of Key Ideas and Publications, and Bibliography for Explainable AI (2019, neutral): “…ones based purely on correlations (Ahn, 1998; Anh and Kalish, 2000; Ahn, Kalish, Medin, and Gelman, 1995; Bechtel and Abrahamsen, 2005; Croskerry, 2009; De Kleer and Brown, 2014; Glennan, 2002; Hegarty, 2004; Hoffman, Klein, and Miller, 2011; Klein, et al., 2014; Szpunar, Sprenng, and Schachter,”
The Routledge Handbook of Mechanisms and Mechanical Philosophy (2017, background): “…is not completely unanimous on what is a mechanism, since it includes two distinct traditions, the first one focusing on mechanical systems, the second one on causal processes (for other attempts of disambiguation of the notion of mechanism, see Glennan, 2002; Nicholson, 2012; Theurer, 2013).”
A Roadmap for a Rigorous Science of Interpretability (2017, background): “Researchers have classified explanations from being “deductive-nomological” in nature [Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948] (i.e. as logical proofs) to providing some sense of mechanism [Bechtel and Abrahamsen, 2005, Chater and Oaksford, 2006, Glennan, 2002].”
Emotions as a mechanism for boundedly rational agents : the fast and frugal way (2005, background): “A mechanism for a behavior can be understood as a system made up of processes (with specific inner properties) that interact in a systematic fashion to generate a non-random behavioral output (Glennan, 2002; Machamer et al., 2000).”
Explanation and understanding (2015, background): “In many cases, we think of explanations as providing some sense of mechanism (Bechtel & Abrahamsen 2005, Chater & Oaksford 2005, Glennan 2002).”
Towards A Rigorous Science of Interpretable Machine Learning (2017, background): “Researchers have classiﬁed explanations from being “deductive-nomological” in nature [Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948] (i.e. as logical proofs) to providing some sense of mechanism [Bechtel and Abrahamsen, 2005, Chater and Oaksford, 2006, Glennan, 2002].”
Recognizing mechanistic reasoning in student scientific inquiry: A framework for discourse analysis developed from philosophy of science (2008, background): “Glennan (2000) describes a mechanism as “a complex system that produces. . . behavior by the interaction of a number of parts, where the interactions between parts can be characterized by direct, invariant, changerelating generalizations” (p. S344).”
Integrating psychology and neuroscience: functional analyses as mechanism sketches (2011, background): “…behaviors, activities) of a system as a whole in terms of some of its components, their properties and capacities (including their functions, behaviors, or activities), and the way they are organized together (Bechtel and Richardson 1993, Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000, Glennan 2002).”
Three Problems for the Mutual Manipulability Account of Constitutive Relevance in Mechanisms (2012, background): “‘As Kauffman (1971) and Glennan (1996, 2002) argue, mechanisms are always mechanisms of a given phenomenon.”
Biological mechanisms: organized to maintain autonomy (2007, background): “…ubiquity of appeals to mechanism in biological explanations and offered models of explanation in terms of mechanisms (Bechtel & Richardson, 1993; Glennan, 1996; 2002; Machamer, Darden, & Craver, 2000; Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2005).2 These accounts of mechanistic explanation (which I discuss in…”
Constitutive Relevance, Mutual Manipulability, and Fat-Handedness (2016, background): “selves to referring to further reading: Leuridan ([2012], §6) and Franklin-Hall ([unpublished], §4), for example, expound problems that come with (SC), and Harbecke ([2010], p.”
Everything Flows : Towards a Processual Philosophy of Biology (2018, background): “…phenomena has led to an explosion of interest in the philosophy of science, as a growing number of philosophers have tried to come to terms with the nature and scope of so-called mechanistic explanations (e.g. Machamer et al. 2000; Glennan 2002; Bechtel 2006; Craver 2007; Craver and Darden 2013).”