How to win the clonewars: efficient periodic n-times anonymous authentication

By Jan Camenisch, Susan Hohenberger, Markulf Kohlweiss, Anna Lysyanskaya, Mira Meyerovich. Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2006

310 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/979e2bca942dffa2130a2085fc7a37bc7fb0c45f

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In Artificial Intelligence

Citations in the corpus

DP5: A Private Presence Service (2015, background): “[7] may be used to anonymously limit registrations per user.”
ANONIZE: A Large-Scale Anonymous Survey System (2014, unknown): “NIZKs we use rely on intuitions similar to those used in constructions of anonymous credentials (most closely related to [11] and the electronic cash/token extensions in [25], [12]), but we have different goals and rely on different complexity assumptions.”
ZKPDL: A Language-Based System for Efficient Zero-Knowledge Proofs and Electronic Cash (2010, methodology): “As such, we have used our language to develop a cryptographic library, Cashlib, that provides an interface for using ecash and fair exchange protocols without requiring expert knowledge from the programmer.”
An Identity-Based Security System for User Privacy in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (2010, methodology): “It is similar in purpose to the glitch protection proposed in [30].”
Engineering Privacy by Design (2011, background): “This is possible thanks to advanced cryptographic protocols [5, 6, 8], which are able to simultaneously satisfy requirements that seem intuitively incompatible.”
Privacy and accountability for location-based aggregate statistics (2011, background): “We also have a simple cryptographic protocol to enforce a quota on how much a client can upload in total over all aggregates, not presented here due to space constraints; however, any existing e-cash scheme suffices here [8].”
Floating Car Data from Smartphones : What Google and Waze Know About You and How Hackers Can Control Traffic (2013, background): “It is possible to identify users trying to send the provider data several times within the same time slot [4].”