Are Random Drift and Natural Selection Conceptually Distinct?
By R. Millstein. 2002
143 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Genetics, History and Philosophy of Science, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/96bc3ef1cfe5031009013a6be26cba2aa755e9f0
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In Genetics
In History and Philosophy of Science
In Sociology and Political Science
Citations in the corpus
- Explanation in Biology: Reduction, Pluralism, and Explanatory Aims (2011, unknown): “Yet this had not been of relevance to philosophers working with a logical positivist framework such as Hempel, who addressed epistemological issues but did not commit themselves to metaphysical views such as the existence of a mind-independent reality and a particular causal structure of the world.”
- A New Foundation for the Propensity Interpretation of Fitness (2013, background): “Elsewhere, she defines selection in general as a ‘discriminate sampling process whereby physical differences between organisms are causally relevant to differences in reproductive success’ (Millstein [2006], p.”
- Selection, Drift, and the “Forces” of Evolution* (2004, background): “Millstein (2002) argues convincingly that Beatty (1984) fails to consistently distinguish between the process and product notions of drift.”