Executive Stock Options, Missed Earnings Targets and Earnings Management

By M. McAnally, Anup Srivastava, C. Weaver. 2008

175 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/96227313042b2583088d85a661d73d5e0ceb381f

Citations in the corpus

• Female CEOs and Core Earnings Quality: New Evidence on the Ethics Versus Risk-Aversion Puzzle (2018, unknown): “Prior studies (for example, Baker et al. 2003; Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Cheng and Warfield 2005; Kuang 2008; McAnally et al. 2008) have showed that CEOs with high stock ownership tend to engage more in earnings management in Table 4 The association between female CEOs and classification shif”
• Understanding Earnings Quality: A Review of the Proxies, Their Determinants and Their Consequences (2010, unknown): “, 1999); ten studies on equity-based compensation including executive stock options (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Burns and Kedia, 2006; Efendi et al., 2007; Johnson et al., 2009; Balsam et al., 2003; Baker et al., 2003; Coles et al., 2006; McAnally et al., 2008; Erickson et al., 2006; Armstron”
• CFOs and CEOs: Who Have the Most Influence on Earnings Management? (2010, unknown): “This is likely because CEO equity incentives are much larger than those of the CFO and therefore believed to be most influential (see, e.g., McAnally, Weaver, and Srivastava, 2008, p. 194).”
• Organizations Gone Wild: The Causes, Processes, and Consequences of Organizational Misconduct (2010, unknown): “For example, it was thought that managers would either smooth earnings or overstate earnings, but recent research has shown that many firms miss earnings announcements just before option grants, thus creating a dip in the stock value that lowers the exercise price of the options (McAnally, Srivastav”
• Corporate Governance and Earnings Management: A Survey of Literature (2013, unknown): “…studies do not suggest a relationship between stock option payments and earnings management (Cheng and Warfield, 2005; Coles, Hertzel, and Kalpathy, 2006; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; McAnally, Srivastava, and Weaver, 2008; Cohen, Dey, and Lys, 2008; Cornett, Marcus, and Tehranian, 2008 69 ).”
• Internal Governance and Real Earnings Management (2016, unknown): “…is less effective in constraining real earnings management for firms with large forthcoming fixed-date option grants, where CEOs presumably have incentives to engage in downward earnings management in order to reduce the exercise price of option grants (e.g., McAnally, Srivastava, and Weaver 2008).”