Keyword Search and Oblivious Pseudorandom Functions

By Michael J. Freedman, Yuval Ishai, Benny Pinkas, Omer Reingold. 2005

524 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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In Artificial Intelligence

Citations in the corpus

XPIR : Private Information Retrieval for Everyone (2016, background): “The basic idea of private keyword search [34] is that the database can arrange its elements by grouping them us-ing keywords.”
Secure Two-Party Computation is Practical (2009, methodology): “The OPRF protocol in [9] is based on the Naor-Reingold prf, which is a number theoretic construction.”
Practical Private Set Intersection Protocols with Linear Complexity (2010, methodology): “Other constructs rely on so-called Oblivious Pseudo-Random Functions (OPRFs), introduced in [14].”
Labeled PSI from Fully Homomorphic Encryption with Malicious Security (2018, methodology): “For instance, it is well known [23, 48] that the sender can incorrectly perform simple hashing, which allows the receiver’s output distribution to depend on the receiver’s full set.”
Efficient Oblivious Pseudorandom Function with Applications to Adaptive OT and Secure Computation of Set Intersection (2009, methodology): “[15] with an application to privacy-preserving Keyword Search.”
Efficient Batched Oblivious PRF with Applications to Private Set Intersection (2016, methodology): “This common feature of an OPRF protocol leaking slightly more than the PRF output is called relaxed OPRF in [6].”
Differentially-Private Multi-Party Sketching for Large-Scale Statistics (2020, methodology): “To achieve a differentially private multi-party protocol, we could have each party run an oblivious pseudorandom function (OPRF) [35] on each item to evaluate the private hash value and then construct the local sketch.”
Fast and Private Computation of Cardinality of Set Intersection and Union (2012, background): “The following client and server privacy definitions follow from those in related work [15, 14, 18].”
On Deploying Secure Computing Commercially: Private Intersection-Sum Protocols and their Business Applications (2019, background): “Definition 4 (Oblivious Pseudorandom Function) [39, 24] A two-party protocol P is said to be an Oblivious Pseudorandom Function (or OPRF) if there exists some Pseudorandom Function family fk, such that P securely computes the following functionality.”
Private Searching on Streaming Data (2005, methodology): “O ur results also can be viewed as improvement and a speedup of the best previous results of sin gle-round PIR with keyword search of Freedman, Ishai, Pinkas and Reingold [12].”
Practical Multi-party Private Set Intersection from Symmetric-Key Techniques (2017, background): “An oblivious PRF (OPRF) [11] is a 2-party protocol in which the sender learns a PRF key k and the receiver learns”
Efficient Protocols for Set Intersection and Pattern Matching with Security Against Malicious and Covert Adversaries (2008, methodology): “A protocol for oblivious pseudorandom function evaluation of this function was presented in [9] and involves the parties running an oblivious transfer execution for every bit of the input x.”
Scalable Private Set Intersection Based on OT Extension (2018, methodology): “There exist several instantiations for OPRFs, described in [Freedman et al. 2005]: based on generic secure computation techniques (using an AES circuit [Pinkas et al. 2009]), based on the Difﬁe-Hellman assumption, or based on OT.”
Faster Private Set Intersection Based on OT Extension (2014, methodology): “A similar approach that uses oblivious pseudo-random functions to perform PSI was presented in [23].”
Countering GATTACA: efficient and secure testing of fully-sequenced human genomes (2011, methodology): “(The latter is reduced to private keyword search and solved using Oblivious Pseudorandom Functions (OPRFs) [26, 37].”