Efficient Oblivious Pseudorandom Function with Applications to Adaptive OT and Secure Computation of Set Intersection

By Stanislaw Jarecki, Xiaomin Liu. Theory of Cryptography Conference, 2009

303 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computational Theory and Mathematics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e605b71afc410051e6bd62f4e140ead0361b699f

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Citations in the corpus

Improving privacy and security in multi-authority attribute-based encryption (2009, methodology): “Finally, our results may be of additional interest because they show new applications of the distributed PRF of Naor, Pinkas, and Reingold [11], and a generalization of the oblivious PRF techniques of Jarecki and Liu [9].”
Fast and Private Computation of Cardinality of Set Intersection and Union (2012, methodology): “Among these, Private Set Intersection (PSI) [15, 29, 18, 26, 19, 27, 12, 11, 22], and Private Set Union (PSU) [29, 19, 21, 16, 36] have recently attracted a lot of attention from the research community.”
Privacy-Preserving Queries over Relational Databases (2010, background): “Private matching and private set intersection schemes [17], [22] consider the problem of computing the intersection of two private sets from two users, such that each user only learns the sets’ intersection.”
Constant-Round Multi-party Private Set Union Using Reversed Laurent Series (2012, background): “This problem, for various types of set operations, has received a lot of attention in both the two-party [10, 4, 14, 7, 6, 17, 9, 15, 8] and multi-party [19, 11, 23] settings.”
Efficient Batched Oblivious PRF with Applications to Private Set Intersection (2016, methodology): “OPRFs have been used for PSI elsewhere, generally in the malicious adversarial model [13, 10, 9].”
Strathprints Institutional Repository (unknown): “This approach is further improved by Jarecki and Liu [28, 29] and De Cristofaro et al [15, 14].”
Practical Private Set Intersection Protocols with Linear Complexity (2010, methodology): “We remark that since the efficiency of [18] is influenced by records’ length, we assume a conservative stance and we choose items to be 160-bits long, similar to the output of a hash function.”
Quid-Pro-Quo-tocols: Strengthening Semi-honest Protocols with Dual Execution (2012, background): “Private set intersection has been widely studied in many contexts, including in the presence of malicious adversaries [9, 13, 5, 20, 21, 7].”
Efficient RSA Key Generation and Threshold Paillier in the Two-Party Setting (2012, methodology): “Another important application is using RSA composites as part of the common reference string (CRS) for secure computation in the UC setting [9], as demonstrated for any function in [45] or for concrete functions such as the Fiat–Shamir authentication protocol [31,35], set intersection [44], and obli”
Location Privacy via Private Proximity Testing (2011, background): “Many other papers have studied private set intersection: [10, 18, 9, 7, 21, 22, 8, 19].”
BotGrep: Finding P2P Bots with Structured Graph Analysis (2010, unknown): “[37].”
Practical Multi-party Private Set Intersection from Symmetric-Key Techniques (2017, background): “Some notable exceptions are [12, 16, 20] in the standard model, and [7, 8, 10, 12, 37, 44, 45] with security against malicious adversaries.”
Delegatable pseudorandom functions and applications (2013, background): “Deﬁnition 4 (Policy privacy) A DPRF scheme ( F , T, C ) is policy private for a policy P if for any PPT A , it holds that The above deﬁnition suggests that the trapdoor that corresponds to a certain policy predicate hides the predicate itself (i) at least among all (distinct) policy predicates that…”
Faster Private Set Intersection Based on OT Extension (2014, background): “PSI protocols for the malicious setting exist, but they are considerably less efficient than protocols for the semi-honest setting (see, e.g., [15] [18] [22] [24] [29] [34]).”