Monitoring and Structure of Debt Contracts

By Cheolbeom Park. 2000

364 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9521eca76d90665e25f3be2f4df7e6a2778316ce

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Citations in the corpus

Capital Structure and Debt Structure (2010, neutral): “For lower quality firms, banks with a monitoring function move to a position where they have a small claim with first priority, an equilibrium that bears similarities to Park (2000).”
Corporate Ownership Structure and the Choice Between Bank Debt and Public Debt (2013, neutral): “Second, as has been widely shown in the literature, bank debt on average has a much shorter maturity (e.g., Tufano, 1993; Stohs and Mauer, 1996; Johnson, 1997; Park, 2000) and is more often secured by collateral (e.”
Collateralization, Bank Loan Rates and Monitoring : Evidence from a Natural Experiment (2012, background): “In Park (2000), seniority ensures that the lender appropriates the full return from monitoring when the borrower's moral hazard problem is severe.”
Bank monitoring: Evidence from syndicated loans (2020, background): “Paravisini and Lin (2013) provide empirical evidence on the value of lender reputation by showing that a bank’s lending business suffers after one of their borrowers commits fraud.”
The importance of bank seniority for relationship lending (2000, background): “Berglöf and von Thadden (1994), Park (1997), and Repullo and Suarez (1998) also focus on the liquidation problem and arrive at similar conclusions.”
Why Do Loans Contain Covenants? Evidence from Lending Relationships (2017, neutral): “Rajan and Winton (1995) and Park (2000) develop models that show how covenants can provide a solution to this problem.”
Bank liquidity provision across the firm size distribution (2020, background): “covenants, with some works studying combination of loan terms (Hart and Moore, 1994; Rajan and Winton, 1995; Park, 2000; Donaldson et al., 2019; Kermani and Ma, 2020).”
Multiple-bank lending: diversification and free-riding in monitoring (2004, neutral): “For example, through monitoring banks could observe firms’ behavior and liquidate them for a total value of C (e.g., Rajan and Winton, 1995; Park, 2000).”
Optimal Supervisory Policies and Depositor-Preference Laws (2001, neutral): “See, for example, Repullo (2000) and Kahn and Santos (2000, 2002).”
Product market competition and debt choice (2018, background): “According to Park (2000), bank monitoring activities induce borrowers to make appropriate decisions, thus reducing moral hazard problems.”