Transaction Costs and Institutional Explanations for Government Service Production Decisions

By T. Brown, Matthew Potoski. 2003

597 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Public Administration

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/94cde9f66c24d6eec74272f0b0b5747118a2cbca

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Jered B. Carr
2. M. Warner
3. A. Hefetz
4. Kelly LeRoux
5. M. Shrestha
6. G. Bel
7. Matthew Potoski
8. T. Brown

In Economics and Econometrics

1. M. Warner
2. A. Hefetz
3. G. Bel
4. Matthew Potoski
5. T. Brown
6. Jered B. Carr
7. Kelly LeRoux
8. O. Petersen

In Public Administration

1. G. Bel
2. M. Warner
3. A. Hefetz
4. Jered B. Carr
5. Matthew Potoski
6. T. Brown
7. Kelly LeRoux
8. M. Shrestha

Citations in the corpus

• What Have We Learned about the Performance of Council‐Manager Government? A Review and Synthesis of the Research (2015, background): “For example, Brown and Potoski (2003) reported that council-manager cities were less likely to contract with private sector firms, but that form of government was unrelated to the likelihood cities opted to contract with nonprofits and other governments over in-house production.”
• TRANSACTION COSTS AND CONTRACTING: The Practitioner Perspective (2005, methodology): “As suggested by a growing body of literature on managing contracts, governments must maintain or develop sufficient contract management capacity to mitigate these risks (Brown & Potoski, 2003a; Gansler, 2002; Kelman, 2002; Romzek & Johnston, 2002; Van Slyke, 2003).”
• Institutional Ties, Transaction Costs, and External Service Production (2009, methodology): “…investments in infrastructure, equipment, or staff or from significant difficulties in measuring and monitoring contractor performance.6 The work of Brown and Potoski (2003) and Shrestha (2008) provides the basis for our expectations about how these two service attributes affect production…”
• Is Contracting out of Public Services still the Great Panacea? A Systematic Review of Studies on Economic and Quality Effects from 2000 to 2014 (2018, background): “Most studies measuring competition find that competition for public services is limited (Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2007 ; Levin and Tadelis 2010; Hefetz and Warner 2012), although the more precise link between market characteristics, institutional settings and outcomes of contracting out still needs furt”
• Local service delivery choices in Portugal: A political transaction costs framework (2007, background): “…focusing on a wider range of options, including private, public, and non-governmental sector alternatives, has gained much attention (Frant, 1997; Warner & Hebdon, 2001; Warner & Hefetz, 2002; Brown & Potoski, 2003b; Clingermayer et al., 2003; Feiock et al., 2003; Joassart-Marcelli & Musso, 2005).”
• Factors explaining inter-municipal cooperation in service delivery: a meta-regression analysis (2016, background): “While much of the literature on transaction costs has focused on service characteristics (Brown and Potoski 2003; Levin and Tadelis 2010), our meta-regression shows the importance of organizational and spatial factors as part of transaction costs.”
• Contracting or Public Delivery? The Importance of Service, Market and Management Characteristics (2012, methodology): “Ease of measurement was significant in all models in the expected direction (easier to measure services more likely to be contracted out) though its effect was weak (Brown et al. 2008). In each of these models, they used the mean value for each service characteristic measured across all places. Levi”
• Explaining Local Government Cooperation on Public Works (2007, background): “Brown and Potoski (2003) demonstrated that the relationship between interlocal contracting and asset specificity is nonlinear.”