The equivalence of price and quantity competition with delegation

By Nolan Miller, Amit Pazgal. 2001

209 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Marketing, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/94979337aa5cbc72e53df5ed271bb3a1d060d7bb

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Amit Pazgal
2. Nolan Miller
3. Matthew O. Jackson
4. Arthur Campbell
5. Lori Beaman
6. Alison Watts
7. Michael Kosfeld
8. Sanjeev Goyal

In Marketing

1. Matthew O. Jackson
2. Amit Pazgal
3. Xuanming Su

In Strategy and Management

1. Matthew O. Jackson
2. Amit Pazgal
3. Vasco M. Carvalho

Citations in the corpus

• Endogenous games and mechanisms: Side payments among players (2005, background): “5 One exception to viewing a game as fixed is delegation games (e.g. see Fershtman, Judd and Kalai (1991) and a recent application in Miller and Pazgal (2001)).”
• Relative performance as a strategic commitment mechanism (2002, background): “Furthermore, Miller and Pazgal (2001) show that if owners have sufficient control over their managers’ incentives, such as relative performance compensation provides, then the equilibrium outcome (prices, quantities, and profits) of a twostage delegation game will not depend on whether the managers ”