Financial Constraints, Competition, and Hedging in Industry Equilibrium

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How researchers see this paper

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Taking a View: Corporate Speculation, Governance, and Compensation (2007, background): “The patterns in the financial characteristics of the speculators are not consistent with " bet-the-ranch " theories of speculation, in which it is optimal for a firm that faces a convex investment function to speculate (e.g., Campbell and Kracaw (1999), Adam et al. (2004)).”
Risk Management and Firm Value: Evidence from Weather Derivatives (2010, unknown): “Adam, Dasgupta, and Titman (2007) demonstrate the value of hedging as a strategic tool in competitive settings.”
Derivative usage and firm value: The influence of agency costs and monitoring problems (2010, unknown): “In the spirit of Froot et al. (1993), Adam et al. (2007) develop a theoretical model showing that in equilibrium only some firms hedge even though all firms are identical, ex ante.”
Dynamic Risk Management (2014, unknown): “Adam, Dasgupta, and Titman (2007) and Mackay and Moeller (2007) study risk management using an ad hoc approach in which hedging is modeled as reducing the variance of the input price or another parameter itself.”
Does Hedging Affect Firm Value? Evidence from the US Airline Industry (2006, unknown): “This type of cross-sectional variation within an industry setting is generally consistent with recent theoretical models such as Adam, Dasgupta, and Titman (2004) and Mello and Ruckes (2004).”