Taking a View: Corporate Speculation, Governance, and Compensation
By Christopher C. Géczy, Bernadette A. Minton, Cathy Schrand. 2007
139 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4f5db3b12a914fd1a262a7e9cd2869f0dddae6bf
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Citations in the corpus
- Interest Rate Derivatives at Commercial Banks: An Empirical Investigation (2007, unknown): “In an unreported analysis, I find that the trader banks are very large banks (see also Gorton and Rosen (1995)), and all my results remain robust to the exclusion of these banks from the sample.”
- Derivative usage and firm value: The influence of agency costs and monitoring problems (2010, background): “One recent notable exception is Geczy et al. (2007) who document that firms with weak internal governance structures are more likely to indicate in theWharton derivative usage survey that they take a view with derivatives.”
- The Use of Foreign Currency Derivatives, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value Around the World (2012, unknown): “Finally, firms may also use derivatives to speculate (Geczy et al. (2007)), an activity which we should again not expect to benefit investors on average.”
- Currency hedging and corporate governance: A cross-country analysis (2006, unknown): “Consistent with this argument, using survey data on the derivatives usage of U.S. firms, Geczy et al. (2007) find that weakly governed firms are more likely to report in the survey that they take a view with derivatives.”