Implementation of Chinese Environmental Law: Regular Enforcement and Political Campaigns

By B. Rooij. 2006

248 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Law, Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/93eb7d92b1bcba7c16a6341f1bb413eca3fc638c

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Law

1. Arthur P. J. Mol
2. R. Ran
3. Genia Kostka

In Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law

1. Arthur P. J. Mol
2. R. Ran
3. Genia Kostka

In Strategy and Management

1. Genia Kostka
2. Arthur P. J. Mol
3. R. Ran

Citations in the corpus

• Racing to the Bottom or to the Top? Decentralization, Revenue Pressures, and Governance Reform in China (2017, unknown): “Local officials are prone to protecting polluters due to their economic importance, enforcing regulations laxly or levying only nominal fines (van Rooij, 2006; Zhang et al. 2010, 311-314).”
• Implementation and Participation in China's Local Environmental Politics: Challenges and Innovations (2013, background): “Some local governments have even introduced local environmental regulations that are more stringent than those of the centre, such as Kunming’s water pollution policy (Van Rooij, 2006).”
• Perverse Incentive Structure and Policy Implementation Gap in China's Local Environmental Politics (2013, background): “Van Rooij (2006) argues that loose enforcement is rooted in a lack of local legitimacy caused by conflicts of interest between national regulations and local stakeholders.”