How Long Do Economic Sanctions Last? Examining the Sanctioning Process through Duration

By S. Bolks, Dina Al-Sowayel. 2000

114 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/93110694101fae2508ccb73165ca4c23d7a30249

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. David Lektzian
2. W. H. Kaempfer
3. A. Lowenberg
4. S. Allen
5. Mark Souva
6. A. Stam
7. Irfan Nooruddin
8. Dursun Peksen

In Sociology and Political Science

1. David Lektzian
2. Mark Souva
3. S. Allen
4. W. H. Kaempfer
5. A. Stam
6. Irfan Nooruddin
7. A. Lowenberg
8. Simone Dietrich

Citations in the corpus

• Political Institutions, Coercive Diplomacy, and the Duration of Economic Sanctions (2004, background): “Although most scholars take for granted the usefulness of economic sanctions, with the exception of recent work by Dorussen and Mo (2001) and Bolks and Al-Sowayel (2000), little scholarly analysis focuses on the duration of sanctions.”
• An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onset and Success (2007, background): “…to economic sanctions because leaders have fewer constraints and are better able to manipulate the economy to counter the effects of sanctions (Bolks and Al-Sowayel 2000), we argue that even though autocratic leaders may have the capability to manipulate the economy to counter sanctions, they…”
• Modeling Selection Bias in Studies of Sanctions Efficacy (2002, background): “The paper thus makes two critical contributions to the study of economic statecraft in international relations, one methodological and the other theoretical.”
• The Determinants of Economic Sanctions Success and Failure (2005, background): “Sanctions against authoritarian governments tend to last longer regardless of which party concedes ( Bolks and Al-Sowyel, 2000 ) because of the ability of leaders to adapt without political ramifications.”
• The Political Economy of Economic Sanctions (2007, methodology): “Similarly, Bolks and Al-Sowayel (2000) show that democratic governments typically do not resist sanctions for long because of the resulting domestic political costs that their 60 Lektzian and Souva (2003) also find that, owing to incentives to achieve successful foreign policies and minimize harm…”