Debt Enforcement around the World
By Simeon Djankov, Oliver Hart, Caralee McLiesh, A. Shleifer. Journal of Political Economy, 2008
948 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Insolvency practitioners from 88 countries describe how debt enforcement will proceed against an identical hotel about to default on its debt. We use the data on time, cost, and the likely disposition of the assets (preservation as a going concern vs. piecemeal sale) to construct a measure of the efficiency of debt enforcement in each country. This measure is strongly correlated with per capita income and legal origin and predicts debt market development. Several characteristics of debt enforcement procedures, such as the structure of appeals and availability of floating charge finance, influence efficiency.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/92d2df390a07a0805a05d07530e6eaf242cbdab8
How researchers see this paper
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In Accounting
- Omrane Guedhami
- Sadok El Ghoul
- Narjess Boubakri
- Mike W. Peng
- Marc van Essen
- M. Carney
- W. Megginson
- Najah Attig
In Finance
- Omrane Guedhami
- Narjess Boubakri
- Chen Lin
- A. Shleifer
- W. Megginson
- Sadok El Ghoul
- R. La Porta
- Darius P. Miller
Citations in the corpus
- Ownership Structure and the Cost of Corporate Borrowing (2011, positive): “Holding ownership structure constant, better investor protection reduces private benefits of control and therefore reduces tunneling incentives (Djankov et al., 2008).”
- Effects of culture on firm risk-taking: a cross-country and cross-industry analysis (2012, positive): “Efficiency of debt enforcement Variable ‘‘Case A Efficiency’’ Djankov et al. (2008) 144 J Cult Econ (2013) 37:109–151”
- Does “Good” Corporate Governance Help in a Crisis? The Impact of Country‐ and Firm‐Level Governance Mechanisms in the European Financial Crisis (2013, positive): “used Djankov et al.’s (2007) ‘Creditor right protection index’. Djankov et al. (2007) and Djankov et al. (2008a) show that stronger creditor rights lead to increased availability of credit.”
- Does Government Ownership Affect the Cost of Debt? Evidence from Privatization (2011, positive): “Additionally, since civil law dominates as the legal origin throughout continental Europe, it is likely that companies rely more on debt issuance due to a perceived lower degree of shareholder rights protection (Djankov et al. 2008; La Porta et al. 1998).”
- Capital Structure Decisions around the World: Which Factors Are Reliably Important? (2015, positive): “Source: Djankov, Hart, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2008).”
- Entry costs and cross-country differences in productivity and output (2008, positive): “I control for property rights by considering five proxies for property rights institutions: the rate of debt recovery from a "going-out-of-business" borrower (Djankov et al. 2006; World Bank 2007), three various indices of property rights protection; and the social infrastructure measure of Hall and”
- Court Enforcement and Firm Productivity: Evidence from a Bankruptcy Reform in Brazil (2013, positive): “14In the standardized case presented in Djankov et al. (2008) company’s debt is divided in the following way: one secured creditor holding 100 units, or 76 percent of the debt, and three unsecured creditors – tax authority, suppliers and employees– each holding 12 units or 8.”
- Control/ownership structure, creditor rights protection, and the cost of debt financing: International evidence (2010, positive): “We consider a large set of national governance mechanisms that encompasses regulatory institutions that previous studies (e.g., La Porta et al., 1998; Dyck and Zingales, 2004; Djankov et al., 2007, 2008) have shown to play a significant role in preserving investors’ rights.”