Do Managers Withhold Bad News
By S. Kothari, Susan Shu, Peter D. Wysocki. 2005
1,899 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9267fb9e7e4f1e1d3e25f4a080f3340065369913
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Jeong‐Bon Kim
- Christian Leuz
- Peter D. Wysocki
- Liandong Zhang
- Jeffrey L. Callen
- Martin Walker
- Xiaohua Fang
- L. Shivakumar
In Finance
- Jeong‐Bon Kim
- Liandong Zhang
- Jeffrey L. Callen
- Xiaohua Fang
- Peter D. Wysocki
- Christian Leuz
- Qiang Cheng
- L. Shivakumar
Citations in the corpus
- Religion and Stock Price Crash Risk (2012, background): “Kothari et al. (2009) contend that managers will leak or reveal good news immediately to investors but they will act strategically with bad news by considering the costs and benefits of disclosing bad news, for example, litigation risk, career concern, compensation plan, and other considerations.”
- The Role of Information and Financial Reporting in Corporate Governance and Debt Contracting (2010, background): “(See, for example, discussions by Watts, 2003a; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; and Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki, 2009.)”
- Capital Market Consequences of Managers’ Voluntary Disclosure Styles (2012, background): “finds that there is an asymmetric market reaction to good and bad news forecasts (Skinner 1994; Anilowski, Feng, and Skinner 2007; Kothari et al. 2009).”
- CEO Overconfidence and Stock Price Crash Risk (2016, neutral): “Rather than focus on firm-level characteristics that encourage adverse but rational incentives (e.g., Jin and Mayers 2006; Kothari et al. 2009), we investigate whether stock price crashes can be explained by executives’ characteristics or psychological traits.”
- Financial Reporting Opacity and Expected Crash Risk: Evidence from Implied Volatility Smirks (2014, background): “Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki (2009) find that a range of incentives, including career concerns and compensation contracts, motivates m nagers to withhold and delay the disclosure of bad news but quickly reveal good news to investors.”
- Crash Risk and the Auditor-Client Relationship (2017, background): “ACCRM Three-year moving sum of the absolute value of annual performance-adjusted discretionary accruals developed by Kothari et al. (2005) TRA Percentage of a specific firm’s equity held by transient institutional investors at the end of the fiscal year ANA Log value of one plus the number of analys”
- Do Industry-Specialist Auditors Influence Stock Price Crash Risk? (2015, neutral): “4 Kothari et al. (2009) describe that “.”