Does REDD+ Threaten to Recentralize Forest Governance?

By J. Phelps, E. Webb, Arun Agrawal. Science, 2010

616 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Global and Planetary Change

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/921453143912dd53ae98c1e815552e13c812c38a

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. P. McElwee
2. S. Engel
3. Adeniyi P. Asiyanbi
4. T. Sikor
5. Jun He
6. Guillaume Lestrelin
7. R. Muradian
8. A. Balmford

In Global and Planetary Change

1. P. McElwee
2. Adeniyi P. Asiyanbi
3. S. Engel
4. T. Sikor
5. Jun He
6. Guillaume Lestrelin
7. R. Muradian
8. N. Burgess

Citations in the corpus

• A political ecology of REDD+: property rights, militarised protectionism, and carbonised exclusion in Cross River (2016, background): “…to land tenure could jeopardize the objective of securing tenure rights for communities and local people, since ... it could encourage governments to refrain from transferring property rights” thereby fostering recentralisation of resource governance (Karsenty et al., 2014 p7; Phelps et al., 2010).”
• Green economy and carbon markets for conservation and development: a critical view (2016, background): “Scholars and indigenous peoples’ organizations have also raised alarms about the effects of markets in nature on rural livelihoods and rights and about the potential of REDD? to facilitate the recentralization of resource and territorial control by states (Phelps et al. 2010).”
• Market Masquerades: Uncovering the Politics of Community-level Payments for Environmental Services in Cambodia (2012, background): “…natural resource management and livelihoods (Agrawal and Angelsen, 2009), while others speculate that it could lead to a ‘recentralization’ of decision making and rights over forests, and a loss of community control over natural resources (Phelps et al., 2010; Sandbrook et al., 2010).”
• Can “fragile states” decide to reduce their deforestation? The inappropriate use of the theory of incentives with respect to the REDD mechanism (2012, background): “Many analysts and NGOs worry that REDDwould be nothing more than an instrument to protect the lucrative stocks of carbon that forests may represent in the future to the exclusion of the local people (Agrawal, 2010; Phelps et al., 2010).”
• The Devil in the Detail: A Practical Guide on Designing Payments for Environmental Services (2016, background): “Again, negative impacts can be a major issue when payments are made for forest conservation (Phelps et al., 2010).”
• Between markets and hierarchies: The challenge of governing ecosystem services (2012, background): “…arrangements focused on a single service (carbon sequestration) create political incentives towards centralized governance regimes (Sandbrook et al., 2010), thus threatening to reverse a positive trend towards decentralization of resource management in the developing world (Phelps et al., 2010).”
• Community Participation and Benefits in REDD+: A Review of Initial Outcomes and Lessons (2013, background): “Concerns about land grabs, evictions, forest access restrictions, and reversals of tenure reforms have all been raised [1,2].”
• The importance of social drivers in the resilient provision of ecosystem services (2011, background): “In addition, under some of the new REDD initiatives, despite promises of participatory democratic governance; the profound environmental threat posed by climate change has renewed calls for re-centralizing resource management (Phelps et al., 2010).”
• Property Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis Revisited (2017, positive): “Providing payments and compensations to local actors as a new mode of governance aimed at improving or maintaining ecosystem services transforms local decision-making and property right arrangements beyond the notion of ‘‘bundles of rights ” (Phelps, Webb, & Agrawal, 2010).”