The Colonel Blotto game

By Brian Roberson. 2006

510 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/91e274c87d37c879cd916d7e2c4fc0672f9ef8ab

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Citations in the corpus

A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments (2014, methodology): “The experiment has separate treatments with an auction CSF and a lottery CSF based on the theoretical treatments of Roberson (2006) and Friedman (1958), respectively.”
SEARCH GAMES : LITERATURE AND SURVEY (2016, unknown): “Roberson (2006) [202] also considered a complex payoff similar to the Shubik and Weber model.”
Open-ended Learning in Symmetric Zero-sum Games (2019, methodology): “Colonel Blotto is a resource allocation game that is often used as a model for electoral competition.”
Generalizations of the General Lotto and Colonel Blotto games (2020, methodology): “3,where the condition implies that that budget hyperplane cuts through the nj-box, or hypercube, above its intercepts and thus the upper bound 15 In Roberson (2006), the construction is carried out with respect to the players’ aggregate resource endowments XA ≤ XB .”
Fight or Flight? (2012, unknown): “The expenditure of 0 (instead of e) would be a strictly dominant strategy for player A if the rule was to allocate a victory to player A with certainty in case of a tie (Roberson 2006; Konrad and Kovenock 2009).”
Clientelism and vote buying: lessons from field experiments in African elections (2009, background): “2 Note that all electoral competition games relate to the Colonel Blotto game (see Roberson (2006) for a review),”
From Duels to Battlefields: Computing Equilibria of Blotto and Other Games (2016, background): “Roberson finds an equilibrium solution for the continuous version of the game, in the special case that all battlefields have the same weight.”
Minimax Theorem for Latent Games or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying about Mixed-Nash and Love Neural Nets (2020, background): “Roberson (2006) found an equilibrium solution for the continuous version of the game, later extended to the discrete symmetric case by Hart (2008).”
An experimental investigation of Colonel Blotto games (2011, unknown): “Under the auction CSF, as demonstrated by Roberson (2006), if budgets are not too asymmetric there exists no pure Nash equilibrium strategies for this game.”