Evidence on the Tradeoff Between Real Manipulation and Accrual Manipulation

By Amy Y. Zang. 2007

269 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9173a0d9b1ec148241aa7edb1b19fc14f157e967

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Citations in the corpus

Real and Accrual-Based Earnings Management in the Pre- and Post-Sarbanes Oxley Periods (2008, unknown): “The accrual-based earnings management variable, ABS_DA, is negative and significant, which indicate that firms substitute between real and accrual-based earnings management activities, a result consistent with Graham et al. (2005) and Zang (2006).”
Abnormal real operations, real earnings management, and subsequent crashes in stock prices (2014, unknown): “…information, a manager can only implement the former during an accounting period, whereas the latter can be performed at the end of the period (Zang 2012).24 Considering this timing difference between DRO and DA, we classify crashes into two types: those that happen in the earnings…”
Substitution between Real and Accruals-Based Earnings Management after Voluntary Adoption of Compensation Clawback Provisions (2015, unknown): “Thus, managers often resort to real transactions before turning to accruals to meet or beat earnings targets (Zang 2012).”
Accrual-Based and Real Earnings Management Activities Around Seasoned Equity Offerings (2010, methodology): “…managers take that deviate from normal business practices.1 Recently, there has been an increased appreciation for understanding and documenting how firms manage earnings thru real activities manipulation in addition to accrual-based activities (e.g., Gunny 2006, Roychowdhury 2006, and Zang 2006).”
The use of advertising activities to meet earnings benchmarks: evidence from monthly data (2010, background): “with Zang [2006], who argues that decisions about real activities occur earlier in the fiscal period, and before any accrual manipulations.”
The Relation Between Earnings Management Using Real Activities Manipulation and Future Performance: Evidence from Meeting Earnings Benchmarks*: Real Activities Manipulation and Future Performance (2009, unknown): “Therefore, as a robustness check, like Zang 2007, I estimate asset RM firm-years as (a) firms with positive income from asset sales (GainA) and (b) firms with small residuals from model 3.”
The Market Reward for Achieving Analyst Earnings Expectations: Does Managing Expectations or Earnings Matter? (2011, unknown): “As an additional criterion to identify firms that are most likely engaging in real earnings management, we follow Barton and Simko (2002), Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005), and Zang (2008) who argue that firms with limited accruals management flexibility are more likely to use real earnings management.”
The Impact of Religion on Financial Reporting Irregularities (2012, unknown): “Finally, prior research suggests that managers may use some combination of real and accrual earnings management or choose between the different methods of managing earnings (Zang 2006; Cohen et al. 2008; Cohen and Zarowin 2010).”
The “Numbers Game” in the Pre- and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Eras (2009, unknown): “They interpret their results as suggesting that f i i s switched from accrual to real earnings management in the Post-SOX period, a behavior consistent with the substitution effect found by Zang (2006). In a recent survey, Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005), report “strong evidence” that managers e”
CEO Narcissism and Accounting: A Picture of Profits (2014, background): “11 Specifically, we follow equations 3, 6, and 8 from Cohen and Zarowin (2010) to estimate Abnormal CFO, Abnormal PROD, and Abnormal DISX.”