Two are few and four are many: number effects in experimental oligopolies

By Steffen Huck, Hans-Theo Normann, Jörg Oechssler. 2004

461 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8f7fc50cde57db39b02871211442e03d55180211

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

In Management Science and Operations Research

In Safety Research

Citations in the corpus

How Much Collusion? A Meta-Analysis on Oligopoly Experiments (2006, unknown): “10, D-53113 Bonn http://www.coll.mpg.de 1 Christoph Engel How Much Collusion?”
Is there a U-shaped relation between competition and investment? (2011, unknown): “Contrary to the corresponding symmetric duopoly games (Huck et al. 2004b), they tend to reveal outputs above the equilibrium.”
Explicit vs. Tacit Collusion – The Impact of Communication in Oligopoly Experiments (2012, unknown): “This results is novel for the communication condition; it has only been observed in the literature for the case of no communication (see Huck et al., 2004, and the literature therein).”
Cooperation in small groups: the effect of group size (2013, unknown): “Huck et al. (2004), for instance, study the textbook homogeneous goods Cournot model with two, three, four or ﬁve ﬁrms per market, where the equilibrium prediction is that quantities are higher in larger markets.”
Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Pricing, and Collusion (2020, unknown): “In contrast, joint defection is interpreted as punishment for a previous deviation and is accordingly followed by return to cooperation.(26) When the state and action spaces are richer, it is possible to mimic more complex strategies as well.”
Excess Capacity and Pricing in Bertrand-Edgeworth Markets: Experimental Evidence (2013, background): “As experimental evidence on markets attests, a small increase in the number of firms can have drastic effects on behavior, particularly with regards to firms’ ability to sustain supra-Nash prices (see Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000, for Bertrand markets and Huck et al., 2004, for Cournot markets).”
Experimenter demand effects in economic experiments (2010, unknown): “…this paper refers below to a number of experiments on markets (including Sarin and Weber 1993; Lei et al. 2001; Ball et al. 2001; Fehr et al. 1993; Huck et al. 2004 and Noussair and Powell 2009); and to Eckel and Holt (1989), Forsythe et al. (1996) and Plott and Levine (1978) in relation to…”
Dictator games: a meta study (2011, background): “meta studies on economic experiments is still fairly limited (Druckman 1994; Harless and Camerer 1994; Croson and Marks 2000 ;Z elmer2003; Huck et al. 2004; Oosterbeek et al. 2004; Blackwell 2007; Engel 2007 ;P rante et al.2007; Jones 2008; Hopfensitz 2009; Percoco and Nijkamp 2009; Weizsacker 201”
Do short-term laboratory experiments provide valid descriptions of long-term economic interactions? A study of Cournot markets (2013, unknown): “Following the design by Huck et al. (2004) we conducted six treatments (summarized in Table 1 and outlined in detail below) all of them implementing a simple Cournot duopoly game.”