Dictator games: a meta study
By Christoph Engel. 2011
1,789 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Demography, Safety Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2e9c60f48af9d3f5164ab9e1fd62414c14908583
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- C. Zoller
- Alexander Vostroknutov
- Matthias Sutter
- Conchita D'Ambrosio
- Daniela Glätzle-Rützler
- Andrew E. Clark
- Felix D. Schönbrodt
- Sonja Pointner
In Demography
- David G. Rand
- Matjaz Perc
- Attila Szolnoki
- Daniela Glätzle-Rützler
- C. Zoller
- Alexander Vostroknutov
- Matthias Sutter
- Conchita D'Ambrosio
In Safety Research
- Matjaz Perc
- Attila Szolnoki
- David G. Rand
- Zhen Wang
- Valerio Capraro
- Stefano Boccaletti
- Jillian J. Jordan
- Daniela Glätzle-Rützler
Citations in the corpus
- Excusing Selfishness in Charitable Giving (2015, neutral): “This occurrence is comparable to Engel (2011)’s meta study finding that 36% of dictators never give any positive amount – which normally could be as little as $1 – to their recipients in dictator games.”
- Do Markets Erode Social Responsibility (2015, background): “For example, citing accounts of environmental damage, animal cruelty, unsafe working conditions and persistent inequality, many scholars have raised the question of whether the inherent nature of market exchange has a perverting influence on people’s motivations to exhibit concern for the social imp”
- An IRT analysis of motive questionnaires: The Unified Motive Scales (2012, background): “Economists as well as psychologists have studied this surprising outcome by taking several variables into account, such as experimenter observation or social distance (for an overview, see Engel, 2011).”
- Do people care about social context? Framing effects in dictator games (2012, neutral): “6At the time of writing, the literature on Dictator games comprises more than 120 published articles; see Engel (2011) for a recent survey.”
- How did distributional preferences change during the Great Recession (2015, background): “Engel (2011) does not report the relationship between real-world economic conditions and behaviors in the laboratory.”
- Does telling white lies signal pro-social preferences? (2015, background): “…of homo œconomicus predicts that dictators keep the whole endowment for themselves, research has shown that a significant proportion of dictators allocate a non-trivial share to recipients (Camerer, 2003; Engel, 2011; Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, & Sefton, 1994; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986).”
- An Experimental Investigation of the Interactions among Intentions, Reciprocity, and Control (2013, background): “…Employee transfers in my experiment range between 13% (Endogenous condition without control) to 22% (Exogenous condition with control) and are lower than typical transfers by dictators in traditional dictator games in which dictators transfer approximately 28% of their available funds (Engel 2011).”
- Gender Differences in Altruism: Expectations, Actual Behaviour and Accuracy of Beliefs (2016, neutral): “The average donation was 27.3% of the total endowment, which is very close to the average donation reported in Engel’s metaanalysis of 616 Dictator game experiments conducted in the standard physical laboratory (28.3%, Engel (2011)).”
- Discrimination in the laboratory: A meta-analysis of economics experiments (2016, background): “…– group cooperation in prisoners’ dilemmas; Hopfensitz (2009) – the effects of reference dependence and the gambler’s fallacy on investment; Percoco and Nijkamp (2009) – time discounting; Weiszäcker (2010) – social learning; Engel (2011) – dictator games; Johnson and Mislin (2011) – trust games.”
- Dictating the Risk: Experimental Evidence on Giving in Risky Environments (2013, methodology): “9 Engel (2011) discusses positive sum games (like our T5) and the strategy method (asking each dictator to identify binding choices for several games, in each case conditional on nature not intervening, and then choose one game at random to determine the outcome).”
- Statistical physics of human cooperation (2017, background): “For example, the canonical result from the dictator game that play is bimodal: most participants either share half of their endowment, or nothing [139].”