Democracy and Redistribution: CONCLUSIONS

By C. Boix. 2003

1,933 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Citations in the corpus

Response to David J. Samuels and Ben W. Ansell’s review of From Open Secrets to Secret Voting: Democratic Electoral Reforms and Voter Autonomy (2014, background): “In particular, a set of papers and two influential books by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson (henceforth ‘A&R’: 2001; 2006) and Carles Boix (2003) have propelled research in this new direction.”
Democracy, War, and Wealth: Lessons from Two Centuries of Inheritance Taxation (2012, background): “Our goal is to understand why, if inheritance taxes are often very old taxes, the implementation of inheritance tax rates significant enough to affect wealth inequality is a much more recent phenomenon.”
The Formation of Voting Habits (2012, background): “The extent to which median voter preferences are unbiasedly reflected in electoral outcomes depends on the level of turnout and the socio-demographic distribution of abstention (Boix, 2003).”
Which Democracies Will Last? Coups, Incumbent Takeovers, and the Dynamic of Democratic Consolidation (2014, unknown): “…data paucity, I am unable to control for economic inequality, which has been prominently theorized to affect both transitions to democracy (Acemoglu and Robinson 2005; Ansell and Samuels 2010; Boix 2003) as well as their survival and eventual consolidation (Acemoglu and Robinson 2005, Chapter 7).”
Gaming Democracy: Elite Dominance during Transition and the Prospects for Redistribution (2014, background): “1 See, for example, Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Boix 2003.”
Does migration promote democratization? Evidence from the Mexican transition (2012, background): “…that a higher income does not promote a transition to democracy, but rather, prevents countries from falling back into dictatorship once democracy has been 1The probably most comprehensive treatments in recent years has been put forward by Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) and Boix (2003). established.”
Beyond Boom and Bust: External Rents, Durable Authoritarianism, and Institutional Adaptation in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (2009, background): “Indonesia, for instance, actually intensified domestic taxation during oil booms, Taiwan used copious amounts of US aid for institutional upgrading and developing an export-led growth strategy, and Norway is an oil-exporting democracy with high-quality institutions that underpin a dynamic economy (B”
Tax structure, size of government, and the extension of the voting franchise in Western Europe, 1860–1938 (2009, methodology): “17The median voter models, as developed by, for example, Meltzer and Richard (1981), Boix (2001) and Borge and Rattsø (2004), also predict that the extension of the voting franchise is associated with more redistribution from the rich to the poor and with an increase in the size of government.”