Evolutionary Game Theory
By Drew Fudenberg, Jörgen W. Weibull. 1996
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- Joseph Henrich
- Ernst Fehr
- Herbert Gintis
- Michael Gurven
- Samuel Bowles
- Colin F. Camerer
- K. Hill
- Jason R. Marden
Citations in the corpus
- Opinion Dynamics and Learning in Social Networks (2011, unknown): “, [79, 80, 92]).”
- Joint Strategy Fictitious Play with Inertia for Potential Games (2005, background): “See the monographs [2], [3], [9]–[11] and survey article [12] for a more comprehensive review.”
- Agent-based control for decentralised demand side management in the smart grid (2011, background): “metering), we aim to analyse how the proportion of the population adopting smart meters and DDSM evolves using the following equations [14]:”
- The Evolutionary Foundations of Preferences (2011, background): “[89], Samuelson [131], van Damme [155, Chapter 9], Vega Redondo [157], Weibull [159]”
- α-Rank: Multi-Agent Evaluation by Evolution (2019, background): “eory, which not only models the interactions in multi-agent systems, but is also normative in the sense that it prescribes how a player should behave based on the assumption of individual rationality [13, 15, 59]. Besides classical game theory making strong assumptions regarding the rationality of p”