COOPERATION, COOPTATION, AND REBELLION UNDER DICTATORSHIPS

By J. Gandhi, A. Przeworski. 2006

877 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Political Science and International Relations, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8ce5397076d3c4980faa5f199c99cef2e6a72283

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Citations in the corpus

The Logic of Authoritarian Bargains (2009, neutral): “For this model, we assume that all citizens have identical policy preferences, but it is straightforward to extend this framework to a population with different preferences (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006).”
Dominant Party Regimes and the Commitment Problem (2009, background): “Gandhi and Przeworski (2006) take a similar view of the problem, arguing that dictatorial institutions, including legislatures and parties, will be used to grant policy concessions and co-opt opponents when the potential for opposition is high.5 These theories are built on the incentives of one…”
Investment without Democracy: Ruling-Party Institutionalization and Credible Commitment in Autocracies (2011, background): “Gandhi and Przeworski (2006) and Wright (2007) also ask when non-democratic rulers might create institutions as credible constraints on autocratic rule; we model the particular mechanisms by which such institutions actually constrain leaders.”
The Effects of the International Security Environment on National Military Expenditures: A Multicountry Study (2012, result): “…to complete democracy is to increase military spending by 220 percent+ These results were less robust than our estimates of the impact of the threat environment, but they indicate clearly that democracies spend substantially less on the military than do autocracies+ 25+ Gandhi and Przeworski 2006+”
Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International Conflict (2012, background): “…have strong incentives to remain loyal to and uncritical of the leader, lest they risk their own political demise (Bratton and Van de Gandhi (2008), Gandhi and Przeworski (2006), Hadenius and Teorell (2007), Linz (2000), Magaloni (2006; 2008), O’Donnell (1978), Pepinsky (2009), and Wintrobe (2000).”
Elections, Information, and Policy Responsiveness in Autocratic Regimes (2015, background): “Although the threat of citizen revolt is a bedrock assumption of many studies of autocracy (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006), about 60% of violent turnovers in autocracies are initiated by military actors, with a further 9% by other government actors (Goemans, Gleditsch, &…”
Autocracy, Elections, and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from Malaysia (2007, background): “Recently, Gandhi and Przeworski (2001, 2006) have argued that electoral institutions such as legislatures increase authoritarian regime stability.”
Provision of electricity to African households: The importance of democracy and institutional quality (2015, background): “, the rural population) since a larger portion of the citizenry is included in the political process, whereas authoritarian regimes will frequently only see to a narrow elite (Bueno de Mequita et al., 2003; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006).”
Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule (2008, background): “…will no doubt possess stronger incentives to offer a power-sharing deal to potential rivals who are strong and ideologically polarized, as in Gandhi and Przeworski (2006), but these rivals will also possess more incentives to conspire if they do not obtain the concessions that they want,…”