How Country and Safety-Net Characteristics Affect Bank Risk-Shifting
By Armen Hovakimian, Edward J. Kane, Luc Laeven. 2002
218 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8b9cbc53a6b2b0206420202c895b4523d010512f
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Citations in the corpus
- Deposit Insurance Coverage, Ownership, and Banks' Risk-Taking in Emerging Markets (2010, methodology): “…Chapman University, wihlborg@chapman.edu Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/business_articles Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Economic Theory Commons, Finance and Financial Management Commons, Insurance Commons, and the Other Business Commons”
- How Does Deposit Insurance Affect Bank Risk? Evidence from the Recent Crisis (2012, background): “Hovakimian et al. (2003) and Laeven (2002) show that weak institutional environments undermine deposit-insurance design.”
- Determinants of bank market structure: efficiency and political economy variables (2009, methodology): “Recent empirical evidence confirms the traditional argument that more generous deposit insurance weakens the market discipline enforced by depositors, and encourages banks to take greater risk (e.g., Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002; Hovakimian et al., 2003).”
- How bank capital buffers vary across countries: the influence of cost of deposits, market power and bank regulation (2010, background): “Recent empirical evidence confirms this effect, showing that deposit insurance increases the likelihood of banking crisis (Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002) and the interest rate required by depositors (Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004), and that loss-control features such as risksensitive deposi”
- Bank regulation and risk-taking incentives: An international comparison of bank risk (2005, background): “Hovakimian et al. (2003) also show that loss-control features such as risk-sensitive deposit insurance premiums, coverage limits, and coinsurance temper the risk-shifting incentives exacerbated by the introduction of deposit insurance.”
- Financial liberalization and bank risk-taking: International evidence (2014, background): “Moreover, the banking literature extensively suggests that deposit insurance coverage increases bank risk by making depositors less likely to enforce market discipline (Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002; Hovakimian et al. 2003; Delong and Saunders, 2011).”