Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders

By Nikolay Marinov. 2005

387 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8b2f4c1df30d803d17d618e227fad8e0f5990b91

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Citations in the corpus

Coercive or Corrosive: The Negative Impact of Economic Sanctions on Democracy (2010, background): “Others suggest that economic sanctions also lead to political instability in sanctioned countries by destabilizing the target leadership (Marinov 2005) and inciting more violence in the forms of protests and riots against the established regimes (Allen 2008).”
The Impact of Economic Sanctions on Income Inequality of Target States (2016, background): “Marinov (2005) argues there are two unequaled costs that the target state must incur – the political costs incurred by the political leaders and the economic costs incurred by the population.”
Playing to the Home Crowd? Symbolic Use of Economic Sanctions in the United States (2011, background): “Sanctions scholars note both positive and negative links between sanctions and the propensity of the public in the ‘‘target’’ state to rally behind incumbents; research in this area has been both qualitative (Galtung 1967) and empirical (Marinov 2005).”
The Political Economy of Economic Sanctions (2007, background): “…argument supporting the claim that democracies, in particular, are inclined to use sanctions against 63 Drawing on a large panel of cross-country and time-series data, Marinov (2005) finds empirical evidence for the destabilizing effect of economic pressure on the leadership of target countries.”
The Impact of UN and US Economic Sanctions on GDP Growth (2015, neutral): “Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that sanction episodes are associated with political turmoil and transition (Peksen and Drury, 2010; Allen, 2008; Marinov, 2005).”
The Political Effectiveness of Terrorism Revisited (2012, background): “A campaign defined as having a “maximalist” objective is fought to induce the target government into ceding power or altering its ideology, whereas a campaign defined as having a “limited” objective is fought to achieve ends that would not directly imperil the government or its citizens’ fundamental”
An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onset and Success (2007, methodology): “We obtained data on the change in leaders during sanctions from the Marinov (2005) replication data set.”
Which Way Out? (2008, background): “771 international sanctions (Marinov 2005), promote economic development (Bates 1981; Wintrobe 1998; Przeworski et al. 2000; Jones and Olken 2005), or time elections (Warwick 1994; A. Smith 2003; Kayser 2005), are fundamentally driven by the leader’s desire to maximize his or her tenure in office.”