Large Robust Games

By Ehud Kalai. 2004

231 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8ad1a31a8e56b61c0671676d65c784ef0155aac9

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Milind Tambe
2. Vincent Conitzer

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Milind Tambe
2. Christopher Kiekintveld
3. Vincent Conitzer
4. Zhengyu Yin
5. Dmytro Korzhyk

Citations in the corpus

• Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information (2007, unknown): “It is also related to the concept of ex post equilibrium that is used in mechanism design (see Crémer and McLean (1985)) as well as in large games (see Kalai (2004)).”
• Stackelberg vs. Nash in Security Games: An Extended Investigation of Interchangeability, Equivalence, and Uniqueness (2011, background): “Kalai (2004) studies the idea that as the number of players of a game grows, the equilibria become robust to certain changes in the extensive form, such as which players move before which other ones, and what they learn about each other’s actions.”