Priceless: On Knowing the Price of Everything and the Value of Nothing
By F. Ackerman, L. Heinzerling. 2004
221 citations recorded by the source corpus.
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8a8d4c430b8314dcd74703acbba1b1ec0bb6a780
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Citations in the corpus
- Reconciling sustainability, systems theory and discounting (2007, background): “Conventional cost benefit analyses have played an important role in this debate, but their results depend critically on inter-temporal discount rates, as well as other questionable assumptions (Neumayer, 1999a; Padilla, 2002; Ackerman and Heinzerling, 2004).”
- The value of a statistical life (2009, unknown): “…death and, therefore, should not be interpreted as how much individuals are willing to pay to save an identified life.3 A procedure often used to estimate benefits from reduced mortality is the human capital approach, in 1For a critical discussion, see e.g. Ackerman and Heinzerling (2004).”
- Energy justice: conceptual insights and practical applications (2015, background): “Though we hold that not everything can or should be quantified [50], individual energy justice country metrics could tell us which institutions or nations are able to create more energy just environments or regimes than others.”
- Valuing Environmental Factors in Cost-Benefit Analysis Using Data Envelopment Analysis (2006, unknown): “3 Yet, many economists and ecologists have pointed out numerous problems, challenges and concerns associated with ECBA (see e.g. Dorfman, 1996; Heinzerling and Ackerman, 2002; Ackerman and Heinzerling, 2004).”
- Measuring environmental inequality (2016, background): “(Heinzerling and Ackerman, 2005; Khaw et al., 2015). If horizontal inequality measurement shows that peoplewith lower incomes generally facemore pollution exposure, rather than less, the question of whether the two variables can offset each other becomes less relevant for welfare comparisons. Fig. 2”