Inequality, institution and differential paths of growth among New World economies

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Political instability: Effects on financial development, roots in the severity of economic inequality (2011, result): “…stabilizing institutions could be due to severe historical inequality having prevented politically stable institutions, in a way similar to how Engerman, Haber, and Sokoloff (2000) show that poor institutions developed in New World economies that were based on exploitive, plantation-style…”
Intergenerational Mobility and Inequality: The Latin American Case* (2014, background): “As a result, by 1900, even in the most highly educated Latin American countries, the literacy rate reached only ∼50% and was less than 20% in the least-educated countries (Engerman et al. 2000).”
The Political Economy of Financial Regulation: Evidence from U.S. State Usury Laws in the 19th Century (2010, unknown): “…argue that wealth-based suffrage laws are primarily driven by private interests [Engerman and Sokoloff (1997), Engerman and Sokoloff (2005), Engerman, Haber, and Sokoloff (2000), and Sokoloff and Engerman (2000)] and are less affected by general economic conditions, making it an effectual…”