The Relation between Auditors' Fees for Nonaudit Services and Earnings Management

By Richard M. Frankel, Marilyn F. Johnson, Karen K. Nelson. 2002

660 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8917657e12b3b021f0482fdfe767de9493a63f5d

Citations in the corpus

• Does Audit Market Concentration Harm the Quality of Audited Earnings? Evidence from Audit Markets in 42 Countries (2013, unknown): “Following prior literature, firms are deemed to have higher earnings quality when accruals are smaller and firms do not avoid reporting losses (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Frankel et al. 2002; Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 2005; Jones 1991), and when earnings exhibit greater timely loss recognition ”
• Recent Developments in Corporate Governance: An Overview (2006, unknown): “Investigating this issue, Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson (2002) conclude that payment for non-audit services can compromise auditor independence.”
• Determinants of Weaknesses in Internal Control over Financial Reporting (2007, unknown): “non-audit fees and firm size (e.g., DeFond et al., 2002; Frankel et al., 2002).”
• Auditor Style and Financial Statement Comparability (2014, unknown): “Francis (2004, 2011) reviews the empirical auditing literature and describes auditor characteristics associated with earnings quality, including the Big 4/non-Big 4 dichotomy, the auditor’s industry expertise (Reichelt and Wang 2010), and engagement-specific factors such as client size (Reynolds and”
• Auditor Industry Specialization and Earnings Quality (2003, unknown): “…between absolute DAC and size and absolute DAC and cash flow from operations; Becker et al. (1998) find a negative association between signed DAC and cash flow from operations and signed DAC and leverage; Frankel et al. (2002) find a negative association between absolute DAC and leverage.”
• Auditor fees and audit quality (2007, unknown): “Frankel et al. (2002) find a positive association between non-audit fees MAJ 22,8”
• Hometown advantage: The effects of monitoring institution location on financial reporting discretion (2011, unknown): “As opportunistic financial reporting discretion can be income increasing or income decreasing, we use the absolute value of abnormal accruals as our initial proxy for financial reporting discretion (e.g., Klein, 2002; Frankel et al., 2002; Leuz et al., 2003; Cornett et al., 2008).”
• Economic Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (2007, unknown): “They point out that the results of Frankel et al. (2002) are sensitive to research design choices.”
• Audit and non-audit fees and capital market perceptions of auditor independence (2009, unknown): “AGEA measures the number of years a firm is publicly traded as of the fiscal year t. Industry dummies for each of the 13 industry groups are as identified in Frankel et al. (2002).”