Committee Design with Endogenous Information

By Nicola Persico. 2004

350 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/88fe4f92ce7aa856e3431c1b2db9806e6eec2d0a

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Citations in the corpus

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF BANKS: A SURVEY (2016, neutral): “A larger board sizemay decrease the motivation to gather and/or interpret information when information acquisition is costly (Persico, 2004).”
Information Aggregation in Polls (2008, background): “4 See also Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996), who allow for the quality of information of constituents to di¤er, as well as Persico (2004), who endogenizes both the policy rule and quality of information obtained by constituents. that there is commitment to a …xed policy response as a function of…”
The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions (2006, background): “For recent works on information acquisition and committe decision, see Cai [8], Gerardi and Yariv [16], Gershkov and Szentes [17], Martinelli [27], and Persico [36].”
On Committees of Experts (2007, background): “First, what is the optimal size of the jury (e.g., Mukhopadhaya, 2003 and Persico, 2004)?”
Opinions as Incentives (2009, background): “The posterior of player i is that ω|s ∼ N (ρs+ (1− ρ)μi, σ̃), Our formulation follows, for example, Shin (1998). Alternatively, we could assume that the adviser must make an assertion that the signal lies in some compact set, S, or R, with the only constraint that s ∈ S, as formulated by Milgrom (19”
The Politics of Attention (2018, neutral): “Earlier works on committee voting with costly information acquisition (see, e.g., Persico (2004), Martinelli (2006), Gerardi and Yariv (2008) and the references therein) do not predict expressive voting, because the information strategies considered there will not emerge endogenously in Chen and…”
Decision Making in Committees: Transparency, Reputation, and Voting Rules (2007, methodology): “αv(A,b,x)−αv(B,b,x) αv(A,a,x)−αv(B,a,x) = wjh∈{a,b}(2) Pr(wjh)Pr(piv|wjh,x,v)(α wjh v (A,b,x)−α wjh v (B,b,x)) wjh∈{a,b}(2) Pr(wjh) Pr(piv|wjh,x,v)(α wjh v (A,a,x)−α wjh v (B,a,x)) , (10)”