Sources of Gains in Horizontal Mergers: Evidence from Customer, Supplier, and Rival Firms

By Fee, Shawn Thomas, Murillo Campello, Charles J. Hadlock, Jun-Koo Kang, K. Lehn, A. Makhija, Michael D. Ryngaert. 2004

687 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/889fd60ea8e5866645d11c46c505293174d2ee05

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Kenneth R. Ahern
2. Nihat Aktas
3. Jarrad Harford
4. Klaus Gugler
5. B. Yurtoglu
6. Tomaso Duso
7. Luo Zuo
8. Yili Lian

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Nihat Aktas
2. Kenneth R. Ahern
3. Klaus Gugler
4. Tomaso Duso
5. B. Yurtoglu
6. Yili Lian
7. Jie Cai
8. Jarrad Harford

Citations in the corpus

• How Effective is European Merger Control (2011, positive): “26 Fee and Thomas (2004) and Shahrur (2005) propose using information on corporate customers to refine the Eckbo and Stillman methodology adopted by DNR (2007).”
• Reputation and Loan Contract Terms: The Role of Principal Customers (2016, neutral): “Wessels, 1988; Fee, Hadlock, and Thomas, 2006; Banerjee, Dasgupta, and Kim, 2008) and financial decisions (e.g., Fee and Thomas, 2004; Johnson et al., 2012; Ahern and Harford, 2014).”
• Corporate Social Responsibility and Stakeholder Value Maximization: Evidence from Mergers (2013, positive): “We use the same set of controls used by Fee and Thomas (2004) for the major customer and supplier CAR regressions and those used by Billet, King, and Mauer (2004) for the bondholder CAR”
• Horizontal acquisitions and buying power: A product market analysis (2011, positive): “Thus, we confirm Fee and Thomas’s (2004) finding that some supplier industries suffer declines in operating profits after a horizontal merger downstream.”
• Are Overconfident CEOs Better Leaders? Evidence from Stakeholder Commitments (2017, neutral): “These measures capture gross profitability and buying power (Fee and Thomas, 2004).”
• Aggregate Quasi Rents and Auditor Independence: Evidence from Audit Firm Mergers in China (2011, neutral): “- 9 efficiency that arises from greater realization of economies of scale and the elimination of overlapping facilities (Healy, Palepu, and Ruback 1992; Houston, James, and Ryngaert 2001; Fee and Thomas 2004). Consistent with this argument, Ivancevich and Zardkoohi (2000) report that the 1989 merger”
• The costs of intense board monitoring (2011, positive): “using the procedures in Fee and Thomas (2004) and find that acquisi-”
• Customer-Supplier Relationships and Corporate Tax Avoidance (2017, background): “Fee and Thomas (2004) and Cen et al. (2013) investigate how customer-supplier relationships interact with corporate decisions in mergers and acquisitions.”
• Proprietary Costs and the Disclosure of Information About Customers (2012, neutral): “2 A short list of recent papers using disclosures of customer information includes Fee and Thomas (2004), Fee, Hadlock, and Thomas (2006), Hertzel, Li, Officer and Rodgers (2008), and Raman and Shahrur (2008).”
• Board Expertise: Do Directors from Related Industries Help Bridge the Information Gap? (2014, neutral): “Authors in this strand of literature have studied trade credit (Petersen and Rajan 1997), acquisitions (Fee and Thomas 2004; Shahrur 2005; Shenoy 2012), and capital structure (Kale and Shahrur 2007).”
• Corporate Equity Ownership and the Governance of Product Market Relationships (2006, methodology): “Thus, following Fee and Thomas (2004), we use a computer algorithm to generate a list of the four names listed in the CRSP historical name field that are most likely to be a match to the customer's name.”
• Bargaining power and industry dependence in mergers (2012, background): “Prior literature has used actual trading partners to identify when upstream horizontal mergers could affect vertical partners (Fee and Thomas, 2004; Shahrur, 2005).”
• Corporate Suppliers and Customers and Accounting Conservatism (2012, background): “…its suppliers or customers with bargaining power relative to the firm (e.g., Galbraith, 1952; Lustgarten, 1975; Porter, 1980; Schumacher, 1991; Fee and Thomas, 2004).10 Using our three measures of the bargaining power of suppliers and customers, the main empirical prediction that we test in…”