Cherry Picking, Disclosure Quality, and Comprehensive Income Reporting Choices: The Case of Property-Liability Insurers

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Is Historical Cost Accounting a Panacea? Market Stress, Incentive Distortions, and Gains Trading (2015, background): “Merrill et al. (2012) provide evidence in support of this prediction, focusing on insurers’ trading in residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) following modifications in their accounting rules that require the recognition of changes in their market values.”
Comprehensive Income: Who's Afraid of Performance Reporting? (2010, unknown): “Yet firms outside the insurance industry are even less likely to use performance reporting (Lee et al. 2006), so cherry-picking cannot be the primary reason non-insurers report comprehensive income in the statement of equity.”
Do key audit matters impact financial reporting behavior? (2020, methodology): “…benefits when financial statement users' ability to detect earnings management activities is low (Cassell et al., 2015; Hirst & Hopkins, 1998; Lee et al., 2006).7 For example, Cassell et al. (2015) examine the association between the transparency of disclosures related to activity in the…”
Comparing the Value Relevance, Predictive Value, and Persistence of Other Comprehensive Income and Special Items (2011, background): “2010), and has also found evidence that companies engage in ‘‘cherry picking’’ by timing management choices about the sale of OCI-related items (Graham et al. 2005; Lee et al. 2006).”