Reasoning in Biological Discoveries: Essays on Mechanisms, Interfield Relations, and Anomaly Resolution

By Lindley Darden. 2006

164 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8831962eb32ccf051038fb2e07c297838bece0b0

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Citations in the corpus

Explanation and Abductive Inference (2012, background): “A third approach, related to causal approaches, is to identify explanations with a description of causal mechanisms, where a mechanism consists of components, operations, and their (often hierarchical) organization, which realize what is being explained (e.g., Bechtel, 2008; Craver, 2007; Darden, 20”
The Explanatory Force of Dynamical and Mathematical Models in Neuroscience: A Mechanistic Perspective* (2011, methodology): “…Bertil Hille’s (1992) many diagrams of possible mechanisms for the sodium channel and Watson and Crick’s failed spatial models of DNA (discussed in Darden 2006). nents in a given mechanism, no matter how remote, negligible, or tiny, without abstraction or idealization, is a philosopher’s…”
Causal logics and mechanisms in policy design: How and why adopting a mechanistic perspective can improve policy design (2019, background): “There is broad agreement in this literature that a mechanism, being ‘theoretical propositions about causal tendencies’ (Hedström, 2005: 108) and thus middle range theories (Mayntz, 2004; Pawson, 2000), are sets of entities and activities organised to produce a regular series of changes from a beginn”
Beyond Reduction and Pluralism: Toward an Epistemology of Explanatory Integration in Biology (2010, background): “An important body of literature is accounts of explanations in terms of mechanisms in experimental biology, in particular cell biology (Bechtel 1986, 2006; Bechtel and Richardson 1993; Craver 2005; Darden 2006).”
Explanation in Biology: Reduction, Pluralism, and Explanatory Aims (2011, unknown): “Salmon made this point by claiming that unlike predictions (which show that a certain event must happen or is likely to happen), explanations are not arguments, neither deductive nor inductive arguments.1 As a replacement to Hempel’s framework, he put forward his detailed model of statistical explan”