Algorithmic Mechanism Design

By Ron Lavi. Encyclopedia of Algorithms, 2008

861 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/88213d39a7c06dcccf6f489776ba37af09028cd9

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Citations in the corpus

A game-theoretic method of fair resource allocation for cloud computing services (2010, background): “The resource allocation problem considered in paper has been studied by Nisan and Ronen in [26, 27], where it was shown that the approximation ratio of mechanisms is between 2 and n.”
Higher-Order Approximate Relational Refinement Types for Mechanism Design and Differential Privacy (2014, methodology): “Mechanism Design Mechanism design was introduced to the theoretical computer science community (with a new focus on efficient implementations) by the seminal work of Nisan and Ronen [41]; see Nisan et al.”
Approximate Mechanism Design without Money (2013, background): “The maximum cost of a y with respect to x is mc( y, x ) = max i ∈ N cost( y, x i ), whereas the maximum cost of P with respect to x is mc( P, x ) = E y ∼ P [mc( y, x )].”
Game theory meets network security and privacy (2013, methodology): “Furthermore, the theory of mechanism design [Nisan and Ronen 1999; Nisan 2007] has enabled researchers to design security and privacy mechanisms based on the analytical results obtained (e.”
Budget Feasible Mechanisms (2010, background): “Procurement auctions, introduced to computer scientists already in [24], were at first studied under utilitarian objectives, seeking to optimize social welfare [24], [12].”
Decomposing random mechanisms (2015, unknown): “The literature refers to the decomposability of a property as universality (cf. Nisan and Ronen, 1999).”
A survey on networking games in telecommunications (2006, unknown): “See, for example, [180] [181] .”