Approximate Mechanism Design without Money

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Coordinate-wise Median: Not Bad, Not Bad, Pretty Good (2020, background): “In the class of deterministic strategyproof mechanisms for locating a facility, the median mechanism has been shown to be optimal under various objectives and domains [Procaccia and Tennenholtz [27], Feigenbaum et al.”
Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences (2013, methodology): “To mitigate this, an alternative is to design a strategy-proof mechanism that provides an approximate solution, following Procaccia and Tennenholtz [484].”
The Core of the Participatory Budgeting Problem (2016, background): “The problem of truthful allocation of public goods without payments is considered in the context of the facility location problem in [27]; however, the setting is unrelated to ours and the authors are concerned with the social welfare or the total dis-utility, not the core.”
Handbook of Computational Social Choice (2016, background): “, auction theory), and topics such as approximate mechanism design without money (Procaccia and Tennenholtz, 2013) or incentive compatible machine learning (Dekel et al.”