Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow

By Indraneel Chakraborty, Vidhi Chhaochharia, Gerardo Pérez Cavazos, A. Silva. 2016

801 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/87a35f5ff156f0e74e7c503c12f796b3f747d03d

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Citations in the corpus

National Governance System, Corporate Ownership, and Roles of Outside Directors: A Corporate Governance Bundle Perspective (2014, neutral): “…corporate control can improve corporate governance and firm performance by replacing inefficient managers and transferring the firm assets to those who can manage them more efficiently through hostile takeovers, management buy-outs, and leveraged buy-outs (Jensen, 1988; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986).”
Climate Change and Corporate Cash Holdings: Global Evidence (2020, positive): “Another important reason for cash holdings is the managerial agency problem (Jensen, 1986).”
The role of venture capital in the emerging entrepreneurial finance ecosystem: future threats and opportunities (2019, background): “These include trade-off theory (Modigliani and Miller 1958, 1963; De Angelo and Masulis, 1980; Fama and French 2002), agency theory (Jensen andMeckling 1976; Myers 1977; Jensen 1986) and the pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf 1984).”
Corporate governance, ownership structure and capital structure: evidence from Chinese real estate listed companies (2020, positive): “Specifically, managers may use debt financing a useful governance mechanism in decreasing the conflict of interests between the agent and principal (Jensen, 1986).”
Do board characteristics drive firm performance? An international perspective (2019, background): “For authors such as Jensen (1986), the concentration of power in one person increases the risk that he or she can develop strategies that favour their personal interests to the detriment of the company, since they may give rise to opportunistic actions and deplete the efficiency of the board, which…”