Chapter Seven – What Do Words Do? Toward a Theory of Language-Augmented Thought

By Gary Lupyan. 2012

97 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Developmental and Educational Psychology, Experimental and Cognitive Psychology

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/879ee04980f45e3b11abb0e1b820b5c16cfd78fb

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In Developmental and Educational Psychology

In Experimental and Cognitive Psychology

Citations in the corpus

How Language Programs the Mind (2016, background): “But mounting evidence has made this position a difficult one to sustain (see also Gomila, 2011; Lupyan, 2012 for discussion).”
What makes words special? Words as unmotivated cues. (2015, unknown): “…become dissociated from particular category instances—are unmotivated—and thus gain the power to construct more decontextualized and categorical conceptual representations that abstract over idiosyncratic properties in favor of those that are most diagnostic of category membership (Lupyan, 2012).”
Cognitive Penetrability of Perception in the Age of Prediction: Predictive Systems are Penetrable Systems (2015, background): “These expectations are actively used in visual prediction (Estes et al. 2008; In learning the word Bbrick^ the label becomes more strongly associated with features diagnostic of bricks and dissociated from features that occur only incidentally and are not predictive of brick-ness (Lupyan 2012b).”
Words and the World (2015, background): “A flurry of findings from cognitive and developmental psychology, however, argue for a much more transformative role of language both in higher-level cognition and in basic perception (for reviews, see Boroditsky, 2010; Casasanto, 2008; Lupyan, 2012).”
Semantic Exploration from Language Abstractions and Pretrained Representations (2022, background): “First, language is inherently abstract: language links superficially distinct, but causally-related situations by describing them similarly, and contrasts between causally-distinct states by describing them differently, thus outlining useful concepts [29, 28].”
The Centrality of Language in Human Cognition (2016, background): “…the fact that it affects performance on tasks in which overt naming is not practical (e.g., Gilbert, Regier, Kay, & Ivry, 2006) suggests that a better way of thinking about verbal interference is that it interferes with otherwise automatic (and largely covert) linguistic processes (Lupyan, 2012b).”