The real story of stuxnet

By david Kus Hner, B. Stauffer. IEEE spectrum, 2013

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A Survey of IoT-Enabled Cyberattacks: Assessing Attack Paths to Critical Infrastructures and Services (2018, background): “In that case, IoT connectivity of ﬁeld devices may be used as pivoting points, in order to attack mission critical systems [82], [83].”
The Cybersecurity Landscape in Industrial Control Systems (2016, background): “In 2010, Stuxnet computer worm infected PLCs in 14 industrial sites in Iran, including an uranium enrichment plant [4], [17].”
From ‘automation’ to ‘autonomy’: the importance of trust repair in human–machine interaction (2018, neutral): “Hoffman et al. 2009, 2013) or increasing the social nature of autonomous systems in general (Kwiatkowska and Lahijanian 2016, September; Morita and Burns 2012), there has been very little subsequent work to explore that possibility.”
Towards secure and dependable software-defined networks (2013, methodology): “The Real Story of Stuxnet.”
Cyber security of a power grid: State-of-the-art (2018, background): “The affected systems include SCADA, PLCs, and nuclear facilities [31].”
Cyber-security in smart grid: Survey and challenges (2018, methodology): “ulnerabilities Modbus network scanning [25] Modbus Protocol Confidentiality IDS, SIEM, Automated[1] security compliance checks [48] DNP3 network scanning [24] DNP3 Protocol Exploitation SCADA Stuxnet [8] Virus, worms, Trojan horse PMU, Control device Confidentiality Integrity Availability Accountabi”