What is happening to China's GDP statistics?

By Thomas G. Rawski. 2001

461 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Gender Studies, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/853664832e4fd0186d7a3615854384b81d86db05

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Citations in the corpus

How the Chinese government promoted a global automobile industry (2011, background): “Rawski (2001) argues that China’s “cumulative GDP growth during 1997–2001 was no more than one-third of official claims, and possibly much smaller.””
Political Incentives to Suppress Negative Information: Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms (2015, background): “Finally, in the realm of economic statistics, local politicians masked the true economic impact of the Asian Financial Crisis on provincial level GDP statistics (Rawski, 2001).”
Trust and growth: a shaky relationship (2008, unknown): “28 See Ren (1997), Maddison (1998), Rawski (2001).”
Quarterly Real GDP Estimates for China and ASEAN4 with a Forecast Evaluation (2004, background): “Rawski (2001), for example, argues that GDP growth figures since 1998 are highly exaggerated and unreliable.”
The World Distribution of Income: Falling Poverty and … Convergence, Period (2006, background): “The complaints pertain mainly to the period starting in 1996 and especially after 1998 (see Rawski (2001)).”
The Law of One Price: Evidence from the Transitional Economy of China (2006, background): “The quality of Chinese data is often criticized because data reporting in China is likely to be affected by political factors (see, for example, Rawski, 2001).”
Why did the energy intensity fall in China's industrial sector in the 1990s? the relative importance of structural change and intensity change (2003, unknown): “But some analysts (e.g., Rawski, 2001) have argued that the official growth rates in the 1990s even further deviated from the real growth rates.”
Why Has China Grown so Fast? The Role of Physical and Human Capital Formation (2011, unknown): “However, it is widely believed that China’s implicit GDP deflator based on the Material Product System approach has understated inflation in China, therefore exaggerating the real GDP growth (Wu, 1997; Maddison, 1998; Woo, 1998; Rawski, 2001).”
The Chengzhongcun Land Market in China: Boon or Bane? — A Perspective on Property Rights (2008, background): “This ambiguity increases uncertainty, encourages corruption, raises costs, and reduces the incentive to invest (Rawski, 2001).”
New Competition; Foreign Direct Investment and Industrial Development in China (2004, background): “Rawski (2001), for instance, suggested that the figure on China’s GDP growth since 1998 was doubtful.”
China's Embrace of Globalization (2006, background): “Most small and medium scale stateowned operations were sold off to their managers or to manager and worker investment groups, 21 Rawski (2001) suggests that growth in 1998 might have been less than one-half of the officially recorded level.”
Half a World: Regional Inequality in Five Great Federations (2005, background): “Many authors argue that Chinese official statistics exaggerate both the level and rate of growth of the economy (Maddison, 1998, 2003, p. 151; Xu 1999; Heston, 2001; Rawski, 2001).”