Discussion of The Effect of Earnings Management on the Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings

By S. Mcleay. 2005

148 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/851744a74074a361920cdc9f86cb194a9d79938b

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Araceli Mora
2. Martin Walker
3. Mohammad Alhadab
4. Juan Manuel García Lara
5. Beatriz García Osma
6. Costas Lambrinoudakis
7. Malek El Diri
8. Evi Neophytou

In Finance

1. Martin Walker
2. Araceli Mora
3. Mohammad Alhadab
4. Beatriz García Osma
5. Evi Neophytou
6. Costas Lambrinoudakis
7. Juan Manuel García Lara
8. Malek El Diri

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Araceli Mora
2. Beatriz García Osma
3. Martin Walker
4. Juan Manuel García Lara

Citations in the corpus

• The implications of research on accounting conservatism for accounting standard setting (2015, background): “Garcı́a Lara et al. (2012) report evidence for US firms that conditional conservatism constrains accruals-based earnings management, although it also increases real earnings management (through real actions, which is potentially more costly). But they conclude that, on balance, the effect of conditi”
• Earnings quality in ex‐post failed firms (2009, background): “…2004; Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; García Lara et al., 2007, 2009; LaFond and Watts, 2008), and that it varies substantially across firms in a predictable way (e.g. Ball et al., 2000; Qiang, 2007), especially when there are differences in accrual-based earnings management (García Lara et al., 2005).”
• Board of Directors' Characteristics and Conditional Accounting Conservatism: Spanish Evidence (2007, unknown): “…demand for conditional conservative measures is lower than in common-law countries given the low litigation risk and high unconditional conservatism (Ball et al., 2000; Giner and Rees, 2001; Garcı́a Lara and Mora, 2004; Garcı́a Lara et al., 2005; Bushman and Piotroski, 2006; Gassen et al., 2006).”
• Corporate governance and earnings management in concentrated markets (2020, background): “to the firm’s ROA (Healy, 1985), or indirectly, i.e. to the firm’s share price (Cheng & Warfield, 2005). The adverse selection problem arises when managers have access to information about the true value of the firm, while outside investors do not have such access. In that case, managers can use the”