The evolution of strategies in a repeated trust game

By Jim Engle-Warnick, Robert L. Slonim. 2004

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Strategy Choice in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (2019, unknown): “One approach trades off goodness-of-fit of a set of strategies versus a cost of adding more strategies (see Engle-Warnick and Slonim 2004, 2006 and Camera, Casari, and Bigoni 2012; for a related but Bayesian approach to this, see Engle-Warnick, McCausland, and Miller 2004).”
Cooperation among Strangers under the Shadow of the Future (2009, unknown): “ Engle-Warnick and Slonim, 2004, 2006, Engle-Warnick, 2007).”
On the Determinants of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: A Survey (2018, background): “Engle-Warnick and Slonim [2004] compare behavior in finitely repeated and infinitely repeated trust games and, consistent”
On Representative Social Capital (2004, background): “games who relate investments to past outcomes in preceding experimental periods (see Engle-Warnick and Slonim, 2004 ).”
Gender Differences in Trust Dynamics: Women Trust More than Men Following a Trust Violation (2014, background): “These strategic reasons for passing could influence behavior in earlier rounds (Bohnet & Huck, 2004; Engle-Warnick & Slonim, 2004).”
Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities (2012, unknown): “Their productivity, innovation, and profitability have made them arguably the world’s leader in their industry, and their management practices have brought them substantial scrutiny—from Fast and Berg (1975) through Hastings (1999) and beyond.”