Remedies for Price Overcharges: The Deadweight Loss of Coupons and Discounts

By Mitchell Polinsky, D. Rubinfeld. 2003

1,079 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/836a0abd282673614b6d0fb684e1199fe43eff04

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In Economics and Econometrics

Citations in the corpus

On Modes of Economic Governance (2001, neutral): “In turn, the expectation of suffering a loss due to such cheating can make all prospective participants unwilling to enter into a transaction that would benefit them all if the cheating could be checked.”
On the effective use of stigma as a crime-deterrent (2004, neutral): “1 Becker (1968) is the seminal article; for recent overviews, see Garoupa (1997), Polinsky and Shavell (2000a) and Levitt (2002).”
When No Law is Better Than a Good Law (2009, positive): “There is a substantial literature on the economics of enforcement – Polinsky and Shavell (2000) present an excellent review – and the consensus seems to be that public enforcement, not private enforcement, is best when victims do not really know who harmed them.”
Regulator reputation, enforcement, and environmental compliance (2005, neutral): “For reference, a fixed effects specification would have a similar feature, but crosssectional variation would not contribute to the identification of any explanatory variables’ coefficients.(17) A second source of potential inconsistency is correlation between the time-variate error”
Renegotiation of Concession Contracts: A Theoretical Approach (2006, neutral): “On this last point, note that the Chicago school has long stressed the importance of the enforcement of laws (Becker, 1968; Stigler, 1970; Becker and Stigler, 1974; Posner, 1972; Polinsky and Shavell, 2000, offer a recent synthesis).”
Tax compliance and psychic costs: Behavioral experimental evidence using a physiological marker (2016, neutral): “Specifically, the violation of social norms has consequences like internal sanctioning (e.g., guilt, remorse) or, in the case of detection, external legal and social sanctions such as prosecution, gossip or ostracism (Polinsky and Shavell 2000).”
Fiscal spending and the environment: Theory and empirics (2011, neutral): “…Dreher and Sturm, 2008; Gemmell and Kneller, 2008]. such as institutions and law and order are considered to be essential areas of investment for the government as the private sector does not have incentives to invest in them at optimal levels [Polinsky and Shavell, 2000; , Williamson, 2000].”
Punishment Despite Reasonable Doubt - A Public Goods Experiment with Sanctions Under Uncertainty (2010, neutral): “…of noisiness for sanctioning relevant information, given that one can quantify the social costs of “Type I” and “Type II” errors (see, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell 1994; Polinsky & Shavell 2000, 2007; Lando 2009; Rizzolli & Saraceno 2009). perspective, but defection is rational for each individual.”
Organized Crime, Corruption and Punishment (2005, background): “Second, when there is free entry, the number of criminal organizations n, the crime and corruption level per criminal organization, C and x, are respectively given by (19), (20) and (21).”