Federalism and the Politics of Macroeconomic Policy and Performance

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Legitimacy, Interest Group Pressures, and Change in Emergent Institutions: The Case of Foreign Investors and Host Country Governments (2005, background): “For example, a regulatory agency or subfederal entity that is not monitored or constrained by other governmental bodies is prone to corruption and overspending (Blanchard & Shleifer, 2000; de Mello, 2000; Rodden, 2002; Treisman, 2000a; Wibbels, 2000) and likely to be more susceptible to interest gro”
A Sequential Theory of Decentralization: Latin American Cases in Comparative Perspective (2005, background): “Recent studies also suggest that, in the absence of proper fiscal and political mechanisms, the transfer of resources to subnational governments may lead to higher levels of inflation (Treisman 2000), larger deficits (Rodden 2002), and poorer overall macroeconomic performance (Wibbels 2000).”