The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership

By Henry T. C. Hu, Bernard S. Black. 2006

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How researchers see this paper

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Debt, Equity, and Hybrid Decoupling: Governance and Systemic Risk Implications (2008, background): “See Hu and Black (2007, 2008) for a review of the theoretical justifications for linking voting and economic rights and additional details on the examples.”
Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance (2008, background): “Exchange traded derivatives must be disclosed, but equity swaps and other OTC derivatives generally do not have to be fully disclosed (Hu and Black (2006)).”
Hedge Fund Activism: A Review (2010, unknown): “Similarly, the hedge fund could trade on derivatives based on the private information about its own agenda (Hu and Black (2006), Brav and Mathews (2009)), which has become a contentious issue in the recent debate regarding disclosure.”
Credit Default Swaps and the Empty Creditor Problem (2011, unknown): “Hu and Black (2006, 2007) and Kahan and Rock (2007) argue that such decoupling can give rise to the opposite voting preferences from those of unhedged common equity holders and thus to ine¢ cient outcomes, such as voting for a merger, which results in a decline in stock price of the acquirer, and…”
Corporate Governance and Blockchains (2017, unknown): “In the USA, a patchwork of different disclosure rules applies to corporate insiders and outside institutions and activists (see Hu and Black, 2006, Table 3).”